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Combating Cyber-Victimization 
Jacqueline D Lipton, Ph.D.* 
 
Abstract 
 
In today’s interconnected society, high profile examples of 
online victimization abound.  Cyber-bullies, stalkers and 
harassers launch attacks on the less powerful, causing a 
variety of harms.   Recent scholarship has identified some of 
the more salient damage, including reputational harms, 
severe emotional distress, loss of employment, and physical 
assault.  Extreme cases of online abuse have resulted in death 
through suicide or as a result of targeted attacks.  This article 
makes two major contributions to the cyber-victimization 
literature.  It proposes specific reforms to criminal and tort 
laws to address this conduct more effectively.  Further, it 
situates those reforms within a new multi-modal regulatory 
framework.  This new approach advocates a combination of 
enhanced public education initiatives, enhanced access to 
effective reputation management services, the development of 
more pro-bono reputation management strategies, reporting 
hotlines, social norms, and industry self-regulation.  The goal 
is to combine law with other regulatory modalities in order to 
facilitate the development of a more civil and accountable 
global online society. 
                                                 
*
  Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Research; Co-
Director, Center for Law, Technology and the Arts; Associate Director, Frederick K Cox 
International Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 11075 East 
Boulevard, Cleveland, OH, 44106, Email – JDL14@case.edu, tel – 216 368 3303.  The 
author would like to thank Professor Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Professor Elizabeth Rowe, 
and Professor Ann Bartow for comments on an earlier draft of this article.  Additionally, 
the author is extremely grateful for comments from participants at the 3rd Annual Privacy 
Law Scholars’ Conference at the George Washington Law School, Washington D.C., June 
3, 2010, including comments from Mr David Thompson, Professor Mary Fan, Professor 
Bruce Boyden, Professor Danielle Keats Citron, Mr Ryan Calo, Professor Jon Mills, Mr 
Avner Levin, Mr Doug Curling, Ms Eileen Ridley, Mr Stefaan Verhulst, and, Professor 
Joel Reidenberg.  In particular, Professor Raphael Cohen-Almagor was extremely generous 
with his time and comments.  All mistakes and omissions are, of course, my own. 
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Introduction 
 
“Once, reputation was hard-earned and carefully guarded.  Today, your 
reputation can be created or destroyed in just a few clicks.” 1 
 
Words can hurt.  Whether true or false, whether spoken by friend or 
frenemy,2 the cyber pen is mightier than the sword.3  In today’s networked 
society, abusive online conduct such as cyberbullying and cyber harassment 
can cause serious damage including severe emotional distress,4 loss of 
employment,5 and worryingly physical violence6 or death.7 Thirteen year 
                                                 
1
  MICHAEL FERTIK and DAVID THOMPSON, WILD WEST 2.0:  HOW TO PROTECT AND 
RESTORE YOUR ONLINE REPUTATION ON THE UNTAMED SOCIAL FRONTIER, 2 (2010). 
2
  “Frenemy” has been defined as “a person who pretends to be a friend but is 
actually an enemy; a rival with which one maintains friendly relations” (see 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/frenemy, last viewed on June 6, 2010). 
3
  Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Responsibility of Net Users in MARK FACKLER and 
ROBERT S. FORTNER (eds), ETHICS, GLOBAL COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA, 11 
(forthcoming, 2010) (page refs to draft proofs) (“Words can wound.  Words can hurt.  
Words can move people to action.”). 
4
  See, for example, Jacqueline Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”:  Developing a Privacy 
Paradigm for Digital Video, 95 IOWA LAW REVIEW 919 , 921-922 (2010) (“[Consider the 
fate of “Star Wars Kid”,] a Canadian teenager who filmed himself playing with a golf ball 
retriever as if it was a light-saber from the Star Wars movies…. His video was posted to 
the Internet without his authorization. A variety of amateur video enthusiasts then adopted 
it on services such as YouTube.  They created many popular, but extremely humiliating, 
mash-up videos of the youth. The young man ended up dropping out of school. He also 
required psychiatric care, including a period of institutionalization at a children’s 
psychiatric facility.”) [hereinafter, We, the Paparazzi] 
5
  Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
61, 64 (2009) (“Victims who stop blogging or writing under their own names lose the 
chance to build robust online reputations that could generate online and offline career 
opportunities.”) [hereinafter, Cyber Civil Rights]. 
6
  See, for example, BBC News, Cyber Bullies Target Girl, May 24, 2003, full text 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/nottinghamshire/2933894.stm, last 
viewed on March 16, 2010 (“[The victim’s] family says there has been a two-year 
campaign of intimidation and she has twice been attacked in school.”); Kara Carnley-
Murrhee, Cyberbulling:  Hot Air or Harmful Speech?  Legislation Grapples With 
Preventing Cyberbullying Without Squelching Students’ Free Speech, UF LAW, 17, 18 
(Winter 2010) (describing case of 13 year old Hope Witsell who committed suicide after 
being the victim of a “sexting” campaign – a variation of cyberbullying in which sexually 
explicit images of the victim or sexually explicit messages about the victim are 
disseminated over digital communications services) [hereinafter, Hot Air]; Danielle Keats 
Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combatting Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICHIGAN 
LAW REVIEW 373, 396-397 (2009) (“The online abuse inflicts significant economic, 
emotional, and physical harm on women in much the same way that work-place sexual 
harassment does.”) [hereinafter, Law’s Expressive Value] 
7
  Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIFORNIA L REV ___, 
[14] (forthcoming, 2010) (“Today, the physical harm associated with information 
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old Megan Meier who believed she had found a soul mate in the fictional 
“Josh Evans” on MySpace was driven to suicide by his spurning words.8  
This is but one of an increasing number of examples of abusive online 
conduct.9  One in four teenagers reportedly experience cyberbullying.10  
Sixty-five per cent of children know someone who has been the victim of 
cyberbullying.11  A 2006 Pew Internet study found that one third of online 
teenagers had been victims of online harassment and that forty per cent of 
social network users have been cyberbullied.12  Online abuses – 
cyberbullying, cyberstalking and cyberharassment – disproportionately 
                                                                                                                            
disclosures can involve murder.”) [hereinafter, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts]. 
8
  Gordon Tokumatsu and Jonathan Lloyd, MySpace Case:  “You’re the Kind of Boy 
a Girl Would Kill Herself Over”, Jan. 26, 2009, NBC LOS ANGELES, available at 
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local-beat/Woman-Testifies-About-Final-Message-
Sent-to-Teen.html, last viewed on March 15, 2010 (describing the last electronic message 
sent by Megan Meier, the teenage victim of an infamous online cyberbullying incident 
before she committed suicide by hanging herself in her closet).  See also discussion of the 
incident in Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 16-22; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in 
Cyberspace:  What Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 1373, 
1385-6 (2009) (describing the Megan Meier incident and legal responses to it) [hereinafter, 
John Doe]. 
9
  For more examples of cyberbullying conduct involving school age children, see 
http://www.slais.ubc.ca/courses/libr500/04-05-wt2/www/D_Jackson/examples.htm, last 
viewed on March 16, 2010; see also Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at 
[10-11] (giving examples of high profile cases of online abuses). 
10
  Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 22. 
11
  id., at 23. 
12
  id. 
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affect traditionally subordinated groups,13 notably women,14 children,15 and 
minorities.16   
 
The prevalence of this conduct suggests that more effective means 
are necessary to redress online wrongs and to protect victims’ reputations. 
Action against cyber-abusers has posed significant challenges for the legal 
system.  Because of the global and largely anonymous nature of the 
Internet, reliance on the law will always be time-consuming and expensive 
for victims.  In the United States, many potential legal solutions will also 
face First Amendment hurdles.       
 
Unlike previous writing in this area, this article situates the law in a 
broader regulatory context.  The author makes specific suggestions for 
reform of tort and criminal laws, but more importantly places the legal 
debate into a larger multi-modal framework for protecting online 
reputations.  This new framework combines specific legal reforms with 
extra-legal regulatory approaches, many of which will prove more 
affordable and effective for victims of online wrongs.  Part I explores the 
categories of abusive online conduct that require regulatory attention:  
cyberbullying, cyber harassment and cyberstalking.  These categories are 
contrasted with their offline counterparts.  Part II identifies gaps in the 
current law as applied to abusive online conduct.  It focuses on criminal 
law, tort law, and to some extent civil rights law.  It suggests ways in which 
current laws could be updated to more effectively combat online wrongs.   
 
                                                 
13
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 65-66 (citing statistics from 2006 
evidencing that cyber harassment is concentrated on women and to some extent also people 
of color, religious minorities, gays, and lesbians). 
14
  Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center:  The Monetization of Online 
Harassment, 32 HARVARD J L & GENDER 383, 392 (2009) (“As women gain visibility in 
the blogosphere, they are the targets of sexual harassment and threats.  Men are harassed 
too, and lack of civility is an abiding problem on the Web.  But women, who make up 
about half the online community, are singled out in more starkly sexually threatening terms 
– a trend that was first evident in chat rooms in the early 1990s and is now moving to the 
blogosphere ….”); 394 (“Self-identifying as a woman online can substantially increase the 
risk of Internet harassment.”); but note that some victims of online harassment are men:  
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [14-15] (describing physical assaults 
and murders of abortion doctors where website list of abortion doctors was involved in 
identifying them); Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 6, at 378 (“While cyber 
attackers target men, more often their victims are female.”). 
15
  Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 6, at 398 (noting that younger 
individuals are particularly impacted by online abuses because their lives are “inextricably 
tied to the net”).  
16
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 65-66. 
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Part III proposes extra-legal regulatory mechanisms that might 
better protect individual reputations online.  It surveys currently available 
options, such as commercial reputation management services,17 along with 
their shortcomings.  It advocates developing educational programs to 
empower victims of online abuses to utilize currently available legal and 
technological means for protecting their online reputations.  It also suggests 
an increased role for reporting hotlines, evolving social norms, and industry 
self-regulation through codes of conduct and “naming and shaming” 
programs.   
 
Part IV concludes by suggesting future directions in the regulation 
of online abuses.  The advantages of developing these extra-legal 
approaches relate to easing the time and cost burdens on victims and 
avoiding some of the First Amendment concerns raised by legislated 
solutions.  Additionally, development of these extra-legal avenues will 
ultimately change the climate of online discourse and facilitate a more civil 
and accountable global online society where service providers play a more 
active role in monitoring and enforcing norms of accountability. 
 
I.  Categorizing Abusive Online Conduct 
 
A.  Delineating the Boundaries of Online Abuses 
 
1.  Defining Online Abuses 
 
“The Internet has turned reputation on its head.  What was once private is 
now public.  What was once local is now global.  What was once fleeting is now 
permanent.  And what was once trustworthy is now unreliable.” 18 
 
Recent literature describes online abuse predominantly in terms of 
cyberstalking, cyber harassment, and cyberbullying.  None of these terms 
has achieved a universally accepted definition, and there are significant 
areas of overlap between them.  Some authors have coined umbrella terms 
such cyber victimization19 and cyber targeting20 to encompass all of these 
                                                 
17
  See, for example, http://www.reputationdefender.com/, last viewed on April 14, 
2010; http://www.youdiligence.com, last viewed on May 20, 2010; 
http://www.udiligence.com, last viewed on May 20, 2010; 
http://www.reputationhawk.com, last viewed on June 6, 2010. 
18
  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 44. 
19
  Kate E Schwartz, Criminal Liability for Internet Culprits:  The Need for Updated 
State Laws Covering the Full Spectrum of Cyber Victimization, 87 WASH U L REV 407 
(2009). 
20
  David A Myers, Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of the Internet:  A Case 
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categories of conduct.  These commentators have avoided individual terms 
for different cyber wrongs on the basis that overlaps between the classes of 
wrong might “thwart clear analysis and the creation of successful 
solutions”.21  There is some merit to the view that an umbrella term – such 
as online abuses, cyber abuses or cyber wrongs - is more effective than 
categorizing individual sub-classes of conduct, although there will be some 
circumstances in which the individual classifications are important.22 
 
 Nevertheless, a brief consideration of the kinds of conduct described 
in recent years as cyberbullying, cyber harassment and cyberstalking is 
useful background.  These terms are derived from their offline counterparts 
– bullying, harassment, and stalking.  As much current law, particularly 
state criminal law, is focused specifically on bullying, harassment, and 
stalking, it is necessary to understand the terms in order to appreciate the 
gaps in the current legal system.   
 
2.  Cyberbullying 
 
“Bullying is an attempt to raise oneself up by directly demeaning others; the 
attacker hopes to improve his social status or self-esteem by putting others 
down.”23 
 
  The term cyberbullying generally refers to online abuses involving 
juveniles or students.24  While it is possible that in any given instance of 
cyberbullying, at least one of the parties may not be a youth,25 discussions 
                                                                                                                            
Study of Cyber Targeting, 110 PENN ST L REV 667 (2006). 
21
  Schwartz, supra note 19, at 409. 
22
  For example, as the following discussion demonstrates, cyber-harassment laws 
usually require a credible threat of immediate physical harm to a victim and thus are less 
likely to be successfully challenged under the First Amendment because threats are 
generally not protected speech:  Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc v 
American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. OR 1999) (threatening 
speech not protected by the First Amendment).  See also discussion in Cohen-Almagor, 
supra note 3, at 5. 
23
  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 105. 
24
  Schwartz, supra note 19, at 410-411 (“the term cyberbullying is typically used in 
reference to juveniles or students, but it is unclear exactly which party must be a minor for 
the situation at issue to constitute cyberbullying. Some commentators consider 
cyberbullying to be the internet counterpart to traditional playground bullying, which 
presupposes that the culprit and the victim are both minors. For others, the term is used to 
reference ‘the victimization of minors,’ regardless of whether the culprit is himself a minor 
or an adult. A third definition for cyberbullying requires that the culprit be a minor, but 
leaves open the possibility that the victim could be an adult, such as a teacher.”) 
25
  See, for example, Tokumatsu and Lloyd, supra note 8 (bully was mother of a 
school mate of 13 year old victim of cyberbullying). 
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about cyberbullying generally revolve around school-age children and often 
call on schools to address the issue.26  The term bullying in the physical 
world has tended to describe conduct that occurs “when someone takes 
repeated action in order to control another person”.27  It can involve 
tormenting, threatening, harassing, humiliating, embarrassing, or otherwise 
targeting a victim.28 
 
In recent years, the term has also been increasingly used in the 
employment context to describe hostile or threatening conduct in the 
workplace.29  In this context, bullying is differentiated from other offensive 
conduct, such as harassment, on the basis that bullying tends to be targeted 
at a particular person for reasons other than the person’s gender or race – 
the typical focus of harassment laws.30  Targets of workplace bullying are 
                                                 
        
26
  See, for example, Cal Education Code § 32261(d) (“It is the intent of the 
Legislature in enacting this chapter to encourage school districts, county offices of 
education, law enforcement agencies, and agencies serving youth to develop and 
implement interagency strategies, in-service training programs, and 
activities that will improve school attendance and reduce school crime and violence, 
including vandalism, drug and alcohol abuse, gang membership, gang violence, hate 
crimes, bullying, including bullying committed personally or by means of an electronic act, 
teen relationship violence, and discrimination and harassment, including, but not limited to, 
sexual harassment.”)(emphasis added); Andrew M Henderson, High-Tech Words Do Hurt:  
A Modern Makeover Expands Missouri’s Harassment Law to Include Electronic 
Communications, 74 MO. L REV 379, 381 (2009) (“ ‘Cyberbullying is when a child, preteen 
or teen is tormented, threatened, harassed, humiliated, embarrassed or otherwise targeted 
by another child, preteen or teen using the Internet, interactive and digital technologies, or 
mobile phones.’  While typical cases of cyberbullying focus on young people, adults can 
also be involved in such behavior.”); Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 6, at 410 
(“parents and educators have an important responsibility to teach the young about cyber 
harassment’s harms because the longer we trivialize cyber gender harassment, the more 
difficult it will become to eradicate it.”) 
27
  Henderson, supra note 26, at 381. 
28
  id. 
29
  ABC News Story, Bullies in the Office:  Bullying Worse than Sexual Harassment, 
available at abcnews.go.com/index/playerindex?id=4527601 (last viewed on May 18, 
2010); BullyOnline.Org, Bullying:  What is It? (“Bullying is persistent unwelcome 
behaviour, mostly using unwarranted or invalid criticism, nit-picking, fault-finding, also 
exclusion, isolation, being singled out and treated differently, being shouted at, humiliated, 
excessive monitoring, having verbal and written warnings imposed, and much more. In the 
workplace, bullying usually focuses on distorted or fabricated allegations of 
underperformance.”), available at http://www.bullyonline.org/workbully/bully.htm#Why, 
last viewed on May 20, 2010). 
30
  Federal Communications Commission, Understanding Workplace Harassment, 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/owd/understanding-harassment.html, last viewed on May 
20, 2010 (noting that harassment occurs in cases of “unwelcome verbal or physical conduct 
based on race, color, religion, sex (whether or not of a sexual nature and including same-
gender harassment and gender identity harassment), national origin, age (40 and over), 
disability (mental or physical), sexual orientation…”). 
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often perceived as a threat to the bully in some way.31  This notion of 
bullying would cover the Megan Meier scenario where Lori Drew – the 
perpetrator of the “Josh Evans” scam – perceived Meier as a potential threat 
to her own daughter.32  She targeted Meier because of this perceived threat, 
rather than because of Meier’s gender or race, attributes that would be 
typically the subject of harassment law. 
 
3.  Cyber Harassment 
 
Like harassment in the physical world, cyber harassment should 
technically focus on targeting people by virtue of their membership in a 
protected class: for example, race or gender.33  There is a fine line between 
bullying and harassment, both online and offline.  In cyberspace, as in the 
offline world, the distinctions between bullying and harassment tend to blur.  
Much conduct that has been described as cyber harassment involves 
mobbing behavior aimed at silencing women and racial minorities.34  This 
conduct seems to cross the line between bullying and harassment.  While it 
is directed at a protected class (women, racial minorities etc.), mobbing is 
typical of bullying35 and the aim of driving subjugated groups offline seems 
more about control than possession – again, typical characteristics of 
                                                 
31
  BullyOnline.Org, supra note 29 (“Jealousy (of relationships and perceived 
exclusion therefrom) and envy (of talents, abilities, circumstances or possessions) are 
strong motivators of bullying.”) 
32
  Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 19 (noting that Lori Drew had suggested talking 
to Megan Meier via the Internet to find out what Meier was saying online about Drew’s 
daughter). 
33
  Federal Communications Commission, Understanding Workplace Harassment, 
supra note 30. 
34
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 64 (“[Noting] the growth of 
anonymous online mobs that attack women, people of color, religious minorities, gays, and 
lesbians. On social networking sites, blogs, and other Web 2.0 platforms, destructive 
groups publish lies and doctored photographs of vulnerable individuals. They threaten rape 
and other forms of physical violence. They post sensitive personal information for identity 
thieves to use. They send damaging statements about victims to employers and manipulate 
search engines to highlight those statements for business associates and clients to see. They 
flood websites with violent sexual pictures and shut down blogs with denial-of-service 
attacks. These assaults terrorize victims, destroy reputations, corrode privacy, and impair 
victims' ability to participate in online and offline society as equals.  Some victims respond 
by shutting down their blogs and going offline. Others write under pseudonyms to conceal 
their gender, a reminder of nineteenth-century women writers George Sand and George 
Eliot. Victims who stop blogging or writing under their own names lose the chance to build 
robust online reputations that could generate online and offline career opportunities.”) 
35
  BullyOnline.Org, supra note 29 (describing “gang” or “group” bullying, also 
known as “mobbing”). 
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bullying as opposed to harassment.36 
 
Because of the overlaps between bullying and harassment and the fine 
distinctions between them, it may be appropriate – at least in the early days 
of online regulation – to address cyber-harms more universally and to worry 
about the distinctions later.  In fact, new distinctions may emerge that are 
more appropriate in the digital age than some of the existing distinctions 
between classes of conduct.  For example, regulators may choose to 
distinguish between communications specifically directed to an individual 
and general communications about an individual on the basis that the 
former conduct may be more immediately threatening or frightening to the 
victim.  If direct communications contain threats, such conduct may be 
easier to regulate through legislation than general online communications 
directed to an audience at large.  Where an immediate threat of harm is 
involved, speech is less likely to be protected by the First Amendment than 
general speech directed to the world at large.37 
 
4.  Cyberstalking 
 
 Cyberstalking is a good example of conduct directed to a victim 
rather than general communications about a victim.  At least in some 
jurisdictions, cyberstalking legislation requires a credible threat to the 
victim.38  Some commentators have described cyberstalking as a direct 
online analog to the offline crime of stalking.  Cyberstalking may thus be 
defined as:  “the use of the Internet, email, or other means of electronic 
communication to stalk or harass another individual”.39  Offline stalking has 
typically been defined as involving:  “repeated harassing or threatening 
behavior”.40  The goal of the traditional stalker is to exert control over a 
                                                 
36
  Erica Merritt, Workplace Bullying, presentation at Case Western Reserve 
University, Cleveland OH, on May 18 ,2010 (session notes and PowerPoint slides on file 
with the author). 
37
  See note 22, supra. 
38
  Schwartz, supra note 19, at 411 (“one commentator states that cyberstalking is 
distinct from cyberbullying because cyberstalking involves credible threats”). 
39
  Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime:  Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L REV 125, 126 (2007); see also Shonah 
Jefferson and Richard Shafritz, A Survey of Cyberstalking Legislation, 32 U. WEST L.A. L 
REV 323, 323 (2001) (“cyberstalking is not easy to define, and no universal definition is 
accepted.  One possible definition is ‘the use of the Internet, e-mail [sic] or other electronic 
device to hound another person.  It can involve ongoing harassment or threatening 
behaviour.’  Query whether this definition really rises to the level of cyberstalking.  Is 
hounding enough?”) 
40
  Goodno, supra note 39, at 127 (“Generally, the goal of a stalker is to exert 
‘control’ over the victim by instilling fear in her; and often such conduct leads to physical 
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victim by instilling fear into her.41  In the physical world, as in cyberspace, 
stalking can lead to actual physical harm.42 
 
While cyberbullying and cyber harassment may damage an individual’s 
reputation or livelihood, cyberstalking is more likely to result in severe and 
immediate emotional or physical harm.  Thus, at the very least, legislation 
aimed at redressing cyberstalking may be able to stand up to First 
Amendment scrutiny more easily than legislation aimed at other kinds of 
online abuses.43  While the First Amendment may protect my ability to say 
something unpleasant about you online – subject to defamation and privacy 
law – it is much less likely to protect my ability to send you threatening 
email messages.   
 
B.  Comparing Online and Offline Abuses 
 
“[T]hanks to the power of the Internet, attackers and gossipmongers enjoy 
instant global audiences and powerful anonymity.” 44 
 
Laws targeted at real world activities often do not translate well to 
cyberspace.  Despite facial similarities between physical abuses and cyber-
abuses,45 there are significant underlying differences.  Cyber-attackers can 
utilize the Internet to harass their victims on a scale never before possible 
both because of the immediate effect of their conduct and the global 
dissemination of online information.46  This immediate and global 
dissemination is inexpensive for the abuser and is not particularly time-
consuming.47  Online postings have a constant effect on the victim, as 
opposed to more transient conduct in the physical world.48  Even where 
                                                                                                                            
action.”) 
41
  id. 
42
  id., at 128 (“cyberstalking involves repeated harassing or threatening behavior, 
which is often a prelude to more serious behavior”); Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 
supra note 7, at [14] (describing case in which online stalked led to murder of the victim by 
the stalker). 
43
  See note 20, supra. 
44
  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 6. 
45
  Goodno, supra note 39, at 128 (“Some experts believe that cyberstalking is 
synonymous with traditional offline stalking because of the similarities in content and 
intent.  Similarities that are pointed to include:  a desire to exert control over the victim; 
and, much like offline stalking, cyberstalking involves repeated harassing or threatening 
behavior, which is often a prelude to more serious behavior.”) 
46
  id., at 128-9. 
47
  id.¸at 129. 
48
  id; Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [9] (“Emotional and 
reputational harm are alive and well today.  In many ways, however, they are far worse.  
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information about a victim is removed from one website, it may be cached 
and copied on other websites.49  Online communications have a permanent 
quality that real world conduct lacks.50  Compounding the permanence 
effect is the fact that online information is easily searchable through Google 
and other popular search engines.51  Thus, damaging information is more 
readily accessible to those who may be looking for it. 
 
 A cyber-attacker can also be physically removed from the victim.  
He may be across the state, across the country or across the globe from the 
victim.52  The unlimited reach of the Internet differentiates online abuse 
from its offline counterparts in three important respects.53  First, online 
abusers can act cheaply and easily from anywhere in the world.54  Second, 
there is a sinister element in the secrecy of the attacker’s location.  The 
victim is constantly left wondering whether the attacker is in the next house 
or far away. 55 Finally, the global reach of the Internet leads to jurisdictional 
problems in enforcing laws against wrongdoers both in terms of law 
enforcement and in terms of gathering evidence from multiple 
jurisdictions.56 
 
One might argue that online abuses are actually less serious than their 
offline analogs because the victim has the option of simply turning off the 
                                                                                                                            
While public disclosures of the past were eventually forgotten, memory decay has largely 
disappeared.  Because search engines reproduce information cached online, people cannot 
depend upon time’s passage to alleviate reputational and emotional damage.”) 
49
  id; Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 977 (“with projects such as the 
Internet Archive, many images will continue to be available in some form even after all 
‘live’ images have been removed from relevant websites.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra 
note 1, at 54-55 (discussing the impact of the Internet Archive on the permanent quality of 
online information). 
50
  id. 
51
  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 53-54 (“Conversations among friends 
were once conducted in private; they left no permanent trace once the last echo faded, and 
they could be spread only at the speed of interpersonal communication.  Classroom notes 
were passed and trashed or at worst intercepted by a teacher and read aloud before being 
recycled.  But many of those same conversations are now conducted online in a blog or 
chat room, in full view of the world, automatically indexed by Google, and broadcast to an 
audience of millions.”) 
52
  Goodno, supra note 39, at 129 (“Cyberstalkers can be physically far removed 
from their victim.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 61-62 (“Online, it is often 
impossible to know if the person you’re chatting with is half a block or half a world away.  
The owner of a website might be your neighbor, or it might be someone in Azerbaijan.”) 
53
  Schwartz, supra note 19, at 129-130. 
54
  id., at 129. 
55
  id. 
56
  id., at 129-130. 
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computer and walking away.  However, in today’s interconnected world 
that is not a viable option.  People who are forced offline forego important 
personal and professional opportunities.57  Also, a victim moving offline 
herself does not stop others from posting harmful things about her that may 
continue to harm her personal and professional development despite her 
own choice not to read the postings.  In many ways, it is better for a victim 
to know what is being said about her so she can take steps to combat the 
abuses.  The question addressed in this article is how best to enable victims 
to combat harms and protect their own reputations. 
 
The anonymity of online abusers also distinguishes them from their 
offline counterparts.  While one might assume that online conduct is less 
harmful than the offline equivalent because it does not involve immediate 
physical contact, the opposite may be true.58  The anonymity provided by 
the Internet may increase the volume of abusive conduct because it may 
encourage individuals who would not engage in such conduct offline to do 
so in the anonymous virtual forum provided by the Internet.59  People are 
less inhibited when faced with a computer terminal than when faced with a 
real live person.60  Cyberspace also enables perpetrators of online abuses to 
                                                 
57
  Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 6, at 398 (“Although targeted women 
close their blogs, disengage from online communities and assume pseudonyms, they incur 
serious costs in doing so.  Women miss opportunities to advance their professional 
reputations through blogging.  They cannot network effectively online if they assume 
pseudonyms to deflect cyber abuse.  They may lose advertising income upon closing their 
websites or blogs.  Unless women are willing to forgo the internet’s economic, social, and 
political opportunities, they cannot walk away from our networked environment without 
paying a high price.”); Mary Madden and Aaron Smith, Pew Internet & American Life 
Project:  Reputation Management and Social Media:  How People Monitor Their Identity 
and Search for Others Online (May 26, 2010), 3 (“12% of employed adults say they need to 
market themselves online as part of their job.”) 
58
  Schwartz, supra note 19, at 130. 
59
  id. 
60
  id., at 130-131 (“The environment of cyberspace allows individuals to overcome 
personal inhibitions.  The ability to send anonymous harassing or threatening 
communications allows a perpetrator to overcome any hesitation, unwillingness, or 
inabilities he may encounter when confronting a victim in person.  Perpetrators may even 
be encouraged to continue these acts.”); Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 10 (“The Internet 
has a dis-inhibition effect.  The freedom allows language one would dread to use in real 
life, words one need not abide by, imagination that trumps conventional norms and 
standards.”); Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at 1383 (“Anonymity frees speakers from 
inhibitions both good and bad.  Anonymity makes public discussion more uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open than ever before, but it also opens the door to more trivial, abusive, 
libelous, and fraudulent speech.”) ; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and Thomas Cotter, Authorship, 
Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L REV 1537, 1575 (2007) (“Studies 
show that even when an Internet user is not anonymous and knows the recipient of his e-
mail message, the speaker is more likely to be disinhibited when engaged in ‘computer 
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spy on their victims in virtual space for extended periods of time without 
ever being detected.61  And naturally anonymity makes it more difficult for 
victims and law enforcement officers to identify and locate cyber-
wrongdoers.62 
 
Another unique feature of cyberspace is that it enables perpetrators to 
manipulate the victim’s identity online.63  Cyber-abusers can both 
impersonate their victims and can manipulate others’ reactions to their 
victims.64  Wrongdoers may engage in identity theft for financial 
purposes.65  Additionally, they may pretend to be their victims, and send 
inflammatory messages to online discussion groups or social networks in 
the guise of the victim suggesting, for example, that the victim has fantasies 
of being raped.66  Retaliation against the victim often follows.  Retaliation 
might include the victim being banned from certain websites, being 
threatened by those who perceive her conduct as inappropriate, or being 
propositioned by people who have been misled into thinking that she is 
interested in engaging in unorthodox sexual activities.67    
                                                                                                                            
mediated communication’ than in other types of communications.  The technology 
separates the speaker from the immediate consequences of her speech, perhaps (falsely) 
lulling her to believe that there will be no consequences.  Since the Internet magnifies the 
number of anonymous speakers, it also magnifies the likelihood of false and abusive 
speech.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 76-78 (describing psychological studies 
on disinhibition effects when perpetrators of harm are physically removed from their 
victims). 
61
  Schwartz, supra note 19, at 131. 
62
  id. 
63
  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 78-79 (“[T]he anonymity provided by the 
Internet allows attackers to easily impersonate others.  On many sites, the lack of verifiable 
identity allows malicious (or mischievous) users to enter somebody else’s name as their 
own…. Attacks by impersonation can be particularly harmful:  How do you prove that you 
didn’t really make an offensive comment that appears to be posted under your name?  How 
do you show that it wasn’t really you who engaged in a juvenile spat online?”) 
64
  Schwartz, supra note 19, at 131-133. 
65
  Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [12] (“Data leaks lead to 
identity theft and fraud.  Identity thieves use SSNs, biometric data, and insurance 
information to empty bank accounts, take out credit cards, secure loans, and flip property.  
They can destroy someone’s credit, precluding their ability to borrow money.  Identity theft 
can undermine individuals’ ability to obtain employment as employers access individuals’ 
credit reports in making hiring decisions.  Some individuals can repair their credit reports 
but only after spending on average over $5,720.  Others, however, may lack the knowledge 
and means to repair their credit reports.  They may be unable to take out loans and get 
insurance.  They might even face financial ruin.  Medical identity thieves leave individuals 
with hefty hospital bills and someone else’s treatment records.”) 
66
  id., at [15-16] (describing cases where cyber-abusers have posted false “rape 
fantasies” online in the names of targeted victims). 
67
  id.   
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Thus, the conduct of a cyber-abuser may be differentiated from that of a 
physical world wrongdoer in that the online abuser does not necessarily 
communicate a direct threat to the victim.  Instead, he can use general 
online communications not specifically directed to his victim in order to 
incite others to directly threaten or harm the victim.  In many cases these 
puppet actors used by the original attacker will not even be aware that their 
activities are unwelcome or threatening in any way.  This may occur where, 
for example, a puppet believes that the victim harbors rape fantasies and 
thinks he is merely playing out those fantasies rather than scaring or 
harming the victim.  For example, in several cases involving the popular 
website Craigslist, bad actors posted messages giving personal details of 
intended victims, including their home addresses, and saying that the 
victims harbored rape fantasies.68  In at least one case, the intended victim 
was actually raped by a third party who claimed he acted at the victim’s 
invitation and that he was merely fulfilling what he thought was her rape 
fantasy.69 
 
It is very difficult for victims of these kinds of impersonation attacks to 
effectively fight back in practice.  Because identities are extremely difficult 
to verify online, it can be almost impossible for a victim to establish that she 
was not the person who posted the comments in question.70  It is very 
difficult for the victim to prove a negative: that is, the “I didn’t do it” part of 
the equation.71  Even if she can, the victim’s revocation may attract more 
attention to the original content and ultimately make the damage worse.72  
Additionally, even if the victim has a way of proving the negative, it may be 
extremely difficult for her to connect with the appropriate audience for her 
rebuttal of the perpetrator’s conduct.    Many websites – like blogs – will 
list comments in order of posting.  Thus, a rebuttal by the victim may be 
deprioritized at the end of a comment list where few readers are likely to see 
it.73  As noted by the founder and the general counsel of 
ReputationDefender, “many victims feel completely helpless when faced 
with an anonymous impersonator”.74 
                                                 
68
  id., at [15] 
69
  id. 
70
  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 79. 
71
  id. 
72
  id., at 144 (“Replying [to false-flag attacks] often draws more attention to the 
original content, making the damage worse.”) 
73
  id (“And a repudiation [of a false flag comment] might never be seen:  because 
some websites list their comments in order by the date they were submitted, a late 
repudiation may show up far down the page and thus be practically invisible.”) 
74
  id. 
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II.  Redressing Online Wrongs:  Gaps in the Existing Legal 
Framework 
 
A.  Criminal Law 
 
1.  Criminal Law versus Civil Law  
 
Current criminal laws, including those targeted specifically at online 
conduct, fail to comprehensively deal with today’s cyber-abuses.  Existing 
disharmonized state laws cannot effectively deter conduct that typically 
crosses state or national borders.  Criminal law shares with civil law the 
shortcoming that victims are forced to relive the humiliation, 
embarrassment, shame, and fear attached to the defendant’s conduct on the 
public judicial record.75  Closed criminal trials may be preferable in 
particularly sensitive cases.76  Absent effective privacy protections, victims 
of online abuses may be reticent to make complaints or to give evidence in 
court.   
 
Unlike civil law, criminal law does not typically require a victim to 
shoulder the costs of a laywer or the associated costs of litigation.  
However, effective criminal law does require prosecutors and police to be 
sufficiently well versed in the law and in the online conduct to make a 
credible case against the abuser.77  The current lack of reliable data on the 
prevalence of cyberstalking might be attributable to both the failure of 
victims to bring complaints, and the lack of adequate training and funding 
for police and prosecutors effectively to deal with online abuses.78 
                                                 
75
  Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 961 (“Plaintiffs are put in the awkward 
position of having to relive the humiliation and embarrassment of the images as they are 
entered into the public record as part of the court proceedings.”) 
76
  Closed criminal trials raise constitutionality concerns and have been difficult to 
achieve in practice in other contexts.  See, for example Press Enterprise Co v Superior 
Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (court reversed order sealing transcript of lower court 
proceedings on First Amendment grounds). 
77
  Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 6, at 402-3 (“[Police officers] are 
often either incapable of properly investigating harassment or unwilling to do so until it has 
traveled offline.  Officers often advise victims to ignore the cyber harassment until that 
time.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 6 (“Law enforcement … lags behind the 
Internet.  In the United States, online law enforcement has generally been focused on major 
fraud and child pornography.  Many victims of ‘routine’ online attacks cannot obtain help 
from the legal system, either because the attackers have disappeared into the digital night 
or because local courts and lawyers simply don’t know how to deal with complex online 
attacks that might have come from the far side of the world.”) 
78
  Goodno, supra note 39, at 156 (“The lack of data [about the prevalence of 
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 Despite its shortcomings, criminal law may be a better option than 
civil law for redressing many online wrongs.  Criminal law seeks to punish 
and deter wrongdoing while civil law seeks to provide remedies that make a 
plaintiff whole.79  Where the concern is with deterring and punishing 
aberrant conduct, criminal law will be an important part of the regulatory 
matrix.  Because of their importance to the regulatory matrix, criminal laws 
should be better harmonized and specifically targeted to today’s most 
prevalent online abuses.  The following examination of current state and 
federal criminal laws identifies existing gaps in these laws in the online 
context, and makes suggestions for law reform. 
 
2.  State Criminal Law 
 
 In recent years a number of states have enacted laws targeted 
specifically at online conduct.80 However, most states still rely on pre-
Internet legislation.81  Nebraska, for example, maintains stalking and 
harassment legislation that does not expressly contemplate electronic 
conduct.  The Nebraska Revised Code states that:  “Any person who 
willfully harasses another person … with the intent to injure, terrify, 
threaten, or intimidate commits the offense of stalking.”82  In this context, 
“harassment” is defined as conduct: “directed at a specific person which 
seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates the person and which serves no 
legitimate purpose”.83  “Course of conduct” is defined as:  “a pattern of 
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, 
evidencing a continuity of purpose, including a series of acts of following, 
detaining, restraining the personal liberty of, or stalking the person or 
telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the person”.84   
 
 This legislative approach fails to cover a number of prominent 
                                                                                                                            
cyberstalking] is partly because many cyberstalking victims do not report the conduct to 
law enforcement, and partly because law enforcement agencies have not had adequate 
training in how to deal with it.”) 
79
  Schwartz, supra note 19, at 427 (“cyber-victimization is better suited to 
prosecution under criminal law, which seeks to punish and deter wrongdoing, than liability 
under civil law, which seeks to make a person whole.”) 
80
  Carnley-Murrhee, Hot Air, supra note 6, at 18 (“In the void of federal legislation, 
many states have enacted anti-cyberbullying laws.  In the last decade, 19 states … have 
enacted laws that prohibit cyberbullying with state boundaries…”). 
81
  id. 
82
  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.03 (2010). 
83
  id., § 28-311.02(2)(a) (2010). 
84
  id., § 28-311.02(2)(b) (2010). 
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online abuses.  Online conduct will not amount to “detaining” or 
“restraining the personal liberty of” the victim.  Online conduct may not 
even comprise “following” a person if the term “following” is confined to 
its traditional physical meaning.  Stalking someone’s online activities may 
not be the same as following a person in the physical world. Additionally, 
the statutory definition of “course of conduct” contemplates that the 
perpetrator must have directly targeted the victim.  In its application to 
communications technologies, the statute requires a direct communication 
to the victim.  This requirement does not fit the realities of cyber-
victimization.  Much online harassment involves the perpetrator posting 
online messages about the victim or even in the guise of the victim, rather 
than communications directed to the victim.       
 
New Jersey previously maintained a stalking law similar to 
Nebraska’s law.  However, the New Jersey statute was updated in 2009.  
The current definition of “course of conduct” in New Jersey contemplates:   
 
“repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical 
proximity to a person; directly, indirectly, or 
through third parties, by any action, method, 
device, or means, following, monitoring, observing, 
surveilling, threatening, or communicating to or 
about, a person, …; repeatedly committing 
harassment against a person; or repeatedly 
conveying, or causing to be conveyed, verbal or 
written threats or threats conveyed by any other 
means of communication or threats implied by 
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or 
toward a person.”85  
 
 Unlike Nebraska’s law, the New Jersey statute contemplates 
activities utilizing any kind of device for monitoring, observing, surveilling, 
threatening, or communicating to or about a victim.  This is a better model 
for legislation aimed at online conduct.  It clearly covers electronic 
communications devices as well as online conduct that involves posting 
messages about a victim, rather than directed to the victim.  Nevertheless, it 
is unclear even under this model whether a perpetrator who disguises 
himself as the victim and posts messages under the victim’s name would be 
covered.  Consider, for example, the scenario where a perpetrator uses the 
victim’s identity to make online comments suggesting that the victim wants 
                                                 
85
  N.J. Stat. 2C: 12-10(a)(1) (2010) 
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to be raped and providing her personal contact details.86     
 
It may be difficult for a prosecutor to convince a court that the 
perpetrator here is effectively “communicating about a person” for the 
purposes of the New Jersey statute.  Where a perpetrator is pretending to be 
another person, he is in a sense communicating about that person because 
anything he does in the guise of the victim indirectly communicates his 
views – be they true or false – about the victim.  However, this conduct is 
not the same as writing something about the victim in the third person.  A 
court might hold that the legislative intent of the statute was limited to 
comments about the victim made by a person other than the victim, rather 
than comments made in the guise of the victim.   
 
Even if the New Jersey statute is broad enough to cover incitement 
of third parties to harass the victim, many other state statutes – even 
relatively recent statutes aimed directly at online conduct – are not as 
broadly drafted as the New Jersey statute.  For example, Florida’s relatively 
new cyberstalking legislation defines cyberstalking as engaging: “in a 
course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, 
images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic 
communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional 
distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.”87  Under this 
provision, there seems to be little doubt that a perpetrator posing as a victim 
online would not be communicating information directed at a specific 
person.88  Thus, while the New Jersey statute may cover these kinds of 
scenarios, the Floridian statute will not extend this far.  The differences in 
drafting between the criminal laws in different states also cause significant 
disharmonization concerns where abusive online conduct crosses state 
borders. 
 
3.  Federal Criminal Law 
 
a.  Interstate Communications Act 
 
One solution to the problem of disharmonized state law would be 
                                                 
86
  Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [15-16]. 
87
  Fla. Stat. § 748.048(1)(d) (2009). 
88
  See also Goodno, supra note 39, at 145 (“Although [the] group of state laws 
which overtly deal with cyberstalking is clearly a step in the right direction, these statutes 
have gaps …. Few of them explicitly address situations where the cyberstalker dupes an 
‘innocent’ third party to harass.”); 146 (“As of March 2007, only three states, Ohio, Rhode 
Island, and Washington, have statutes that explicitly address cases where third parties 
innocently harass the victim at the cyberstalker’s bidding.”) 
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greater focus on federal criminal legislation.  Unfortunately, the current 
federal legislation contains many gaps and inconsistencies when applied to 
online abuses.89  The federal laws that are most relevant to online wrongs 
are mainly found in those sections of the United States Code that deal with 
electronic communications and computer systems.  The Interstate 
Communications Act, for example, provides that:  “Whoever transmits in 
interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to 
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”90  
This provision has limited application to online abuses because of its 
requirement of a threat of physical injury. 91   Many online abuses do not 
contain overt physical threats.  In fact, many abusive communications are 
not specifically directed at their targets, but rather are comments about their 
targeted victims on generally accessible websites. 92  The Interstate 
Communications Act will also not cover situations where a perpetrator 
poses as a victim online to incite third parties to harass or harm the victim. 
 
b.  Telephone Harassment Act 
 
The federal Telephone Harassment Act may have some application 
to online abuses.  As amended in 2006, the statute prohibits a person from 
making a telephone call or utilizing a communications device without 
disclosing his identity and “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass 
any person at the called number or who receives the communications”.93  
The revisions to the statute were intended to capture harassing email 
messages.94  While the provision will cover some cyberspace abuses, 
particularly the sending of threatening or harassing emails, it has significant 
limitations.  For one thing, it is limited to acts “in interstate or foreign 
communications,”95 although this may not be a very significant hurdle in 
practice.  Courts may hold that any activities involving global 
communications devices – such as the Internet - occur in interstate or 
foreign communications.   
 
More importantly, the statute will not cover situations where an 
Internet communication is not directed towards a particular recipient.  The 
                                                 
89
  Carnley-Murrhee, Hot Air, supra note 6, at 18 (describing federal legislation in 
the cyberbullying area as being a “void”). 
90
  18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 
91
  Goodno, supra note 39, at 147-148. 
92
  id. 
93
  47 U.S.C.S. § 223(a)(1)(C). 
94
  Goodno, supra note 39, at 148-9. 
95
  27 U.S.C.S. § 223(a)(1). 
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requirement that the victim must be the recipient of a specific 
communication will not cover situations where a perpetrator simply posts 
information about the victim on a website, or where he poses as the 
victim.96  Another limitation of the statute is that it carves out situations 
where the perpetrator has not remained anonymous.97  In order for the 
prohibition to apply, the perpetrator must have failed to disclose his 
identity.98  In cases where a victim knows the identity of the harasser, the 
statute will not apply.   
 
c. Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act 
 
Another recently amended federal statute that may apply to online 
abuses is the Federal Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act 
(FISPPA).  This statute prohibits harassment and intimidation in “interstate 
or foreign commerce”99 and now specifically extends to conduct that 
involves using “the mail, any interactive computer service, or any facility of 
interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that causes 
substantial emotional distress”.  As with the Telephone Harassment Act, the 
extent to which the “interstate or foreign commerce” requirement will limit 
the potential application of the FISPPA is unclear.   
 
However, the FISPPA improves on the Telephone Harassment Act 
to the extent that it does not require a communication to be specifically 
directed to a victim.  The FISPPA focuses instead on conduct that utilizes 
an interactive computer service to create a state of emotional distress in the 
victim, regardless of whether any communications posted on the computer 
service were specifically directed to the victim as a recipient.100  Unlike the 
                                                 
96
  Goodno, supra note 39, at 150 (“[The Telephone Harassment Statute] applies only 
to direct communications between the stalker and victim, e.g., the statute would only be 
triggered when the cyberstalker sends an e-mail [sic] directly to the victim.  Thus, the 
amended statute is inadequate to deal with behavior where the cyberstalker indirectly 
harasses or terrorizes his victim by posting messages on a bulletin board, creating a 
Website aimed at terrorizing his victim, or encouraging third parties to harass the victim.”) 
97
  id. (“It seems odd to only make cyberstalking a crime where the identity of the 
cyberstalker is unknown.  This element seemingly, and without reason, carves out a 
number of terrifying cases where the victim knows the identity of the cyberstalker.”) 
98
  Lidsky and Cotter, supra note 60, at 1590 (raising constitutional concerns about 
the validity of this statute on First Amendment grounds because the statute fails to protect 
constitutionally protected values inherent in the defendant’s anonymity). 
99
  18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2261A(1), 2261A(2). 
100
  Goodno, supra note 39, at 152 (“[T]he newly amended § 2261A addresses many 
of the shortcomings of the other federal statutes.  It does not have a ‘true/credible threat’ 
requirement; but rather adopts a standard that measures the victim’s ‘reasonable fear’ or 
‘substantial emotional distress.’ ”) 
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Telephone Harassment Act, the FISPPA will apply where the defendant is 
not anonymous.101  Like the other federal legislation described above, the 
FISPPA does not expressly deal with situations where the perpetrator of the 
online abuse poses as the victim online. 
 
 
d. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
 
One other federal criminal law that may be relevant to online abuse 
is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).102  This legislation was 
originally aimed at unauthorized hacking into computer systems and was 
not focused on personal attacks.  However, prosecutors in the Megan 
Meier/Lori Drew case utilized the CFAA creatively to bring criminal 
proceedings against Drew, who had perpetrated a cyberbullying attack 
resulting in the suicide of thirteen year old Meier. 103  Drew was the mother 
of a classmate of Meier and knew that Meier struggled with depression.  On 
the popular social networking site, MySpace, Drew posed as a sixteen year 
old boy named Josh Evans who started a friendship with Meier and later 
sent her insulting and harassing messages, concluding with a message that 
the world would be better off without her.104  Evans never really existed.  
He was a fictional creation of Drew, who had developed the Evans persona 
to find out whether Meier would say anything negative about Drew’s 
daughter online.105   
 
Drew’s conduct was not a criminal act under local Missouri law.106  
However, federal prosecutors charged Drew with unauthorized access to a 
computer under the CFAA.  They utilized the criminal trespass provisions 
of the statute arguing that Drew had infringed MySpace’s terms of service 
by failing to provide accurate registration information, engaging in abusive 
conduct, and harassing other people.107  During the initial trial, a jury found 
that Drew had infringed provisions of the CFAA relating to making 
                                                 
101
  id. (“[The FISPPA does not] limit coverage of the ‘use’ of the computer to only 
anonymous e-mail [sic] messages.”) 
102
  18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
103
  Henderson, supra note 26, at 393 (“Despite her egregious actions, Missouri 
officials were unable to charge Lori Drew with a crime.  However, after creatively 
interpreting the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, federal officials charged her with 
conspiracy and unauthorized access of a computer.”); Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at 
1386 (describing the legal action in the Lori Drew case). 
104
  Henderson, supra note 26, at 379. 
105
  id., at 379-380. 
106
  id., at 380. 
107
  id., at 393. 
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unauthorized access to, or exceeding authorized access to, a computer.108  
However, on appeal, a motion by Drew to acquit and overturn the 
misdemeanor conviction was upheld.109  The court found that the CFAA 
would be void for vagueness if it imposed criminal liability on anyone who 
infringed a website’s posted terms of service.110  Thus, Drew’s misuse of 
the MySpace website could not result in criminal liability under the CFAA. 
 
e.  Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prvention Bill 
 
In the wake of the Meier incident, federal legislation was proposed 
that would be more clearly directed at cyberbullying than any existing 
federal laws.  The Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Bill111 was 
introduced in 2008 but never enacted.  If it had been implemented, it would 
have prohibited transmitting a communication “with the intent to coerce, 
intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person” and 
“using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile 
behavior”.112  The definitions of “communication” and “electronic means” 
in the bill were fairly broad and, if enacted, would have encompassed 
modern Web 2.0 technologies such as blogs and online social networks.113   
 
While this legislation would have been broad enough to cover much 
abusive online conduct, it is arguably overbroad for a variety of reasons.  
                                                 
108
  United States v Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 453 (2009) (“The [trial] jury did find 
Defendant ‘guilty’ ‘of [on the dates specified in the Indictment] accessing a computer 
involved in interstate or foreign communication without authorization or in excess of 
authorization to obtain information in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 
1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(A), a misdemeanor.’”) 
109
  United States v Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (2009). 
110
  id., at 464 (“The pivotal issue herein is whether basing a CFAA misdemeanor 
violation as per 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C) and 1030(c)(2)(A) upon the conscious 
violation of a website's terms of service runs afoul of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. This 
Court concludes that it does primarily because of the absence of minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement, but also because of actual notice deficiencies.  ….[T]erms of 
service which are incorporated into a browsewrap or clickwrap agreement can, like any 
other type of contract, define the limits of authorized access as to a website and its 
concomitant computer/server(s). However, the question is whether individuals of ‘common 
intelligence’ are on notice that a breach of a terms of service contract can become a crime 
under the CFAA. Arguably, they are not.”); 467 (“In sum, if any conscious breach of a 
website's terms of service is held to be sufficient by itself to constitute intentionally 
accessing a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization, the result will be 
that section 1030(a)(2)(C) becomes a law that affords too much discretion to the police and 
too little notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet].’”) 
111
  H.R. 6123, 110th Cong. (2008). 
112
  id. at § 3(a). 
113
  id., at § 3(a). 
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For one thing, it is not confined to a repeated course of conduct and so 
could inadvertently catch one-time situations where people have acted 
uncharacteristically out of anger in the heat of the moment.114  Additionally, 
while aimed at the Meier incident and drafted with a view to protecting 
minors,115 the text of the statute is not expressly limited to conduct 
involving minors.  As a result, the bill may be unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds because it may inadvertently sanction constitutionally 
protected expression amongst adults.116   
 
In the wake of the Meier incident, the Missouri legislature updated 
the state harassment law to ensure that online bullying would be covered.  
As now drafted, the Missouri anti-harassment law provides that: 
 
“A person commits the crime of harassment if he or she: 
 
   …. 
 
 (3) Knowingly frightens, intimidates, or causes emotional distress 
to another person by anonymously making a telephone call or any 
electronic communication; or 
 
 (4) Knowingly communicates with another person who is, or who 
purports to be, seventeen years of age or younger and in so doing 
and without good cause recklessly frightens, intimidates, or causes 
emotional distress to such other person; or 
 
… 
  
(6) Without good cause engages in any other act with the 
purpose to frighten, intimidate, or cause emotional distress to 
                                                 
114
  ROBERT SUTTON, THE NO ASSHOLE RULE:  BUILDING A CIVILIZED WORKPLACE 
AND SURVIVING ONE THAT ISN’T, 11 (2007) (“Psychologists make the distinction between 
states (fleeting feelings, thoughts, and actions) and traits (enduring personality 
characteristics) by looking for consistency across places and times…”). 
115
  H.R. 6123, 110th Cong., § 2 (2008) (contemplating that the purpose of the bill is to 
protect children aged from 2 to 17 years old). 
116
  In the past, legislatures have had difficulty establishing that laws abridging online 
speech are sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive First Amendment scrutiny.  See, for 
example, Reno v American Civil Liberties Union, 521 I.S. 844 (1997) (holding that a 
statute attempting to restrict minors’ access to harmful material was unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment); Ashcroft v American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) 
(holding that a statute that imposed criminal penalties for posting content harmful to 
minors on the Internet was unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
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another person, cause such person to be frightened, intimidated, or 
emotionally distressed, and such person's response to the act is one 
of a person of average sensibilities considering the age of such 
person.”117 
 
This statute is a good model for legislating against abusive online 
conduct.  It covers multiple communications media, including the Internet.  
It also focuses on the victim’s state of mind.  While several of the sub-
sections require the victim to actually be the recipient of the harasser’s 
communications,118 the final sub-section does not require a communication 
directed to the victim.119 Thus, it could cover a situation where the harasser 
poses as the victim online and incites third parties to harass the victim.  That 
sub-section also includes a reasonableness requirement with respect to the 
victim’s response.  For liability to attach, the victim’s response should be 
appropriate to a person of “average sensibilities considering the age” of the 
victim.   
 
One problematic aspect of the statute is that it is not limited to 
situations in which the harasser engages in a repetitive pattern of abusive 
conduct towards the victim.  Thus, it might catch a one-time situation where 
a perpetrator acts out of character in the heat of the moment.120  This may be 
a factor that courts should consider in applying the statute, even though the 
express words of the statute do not require the courts to identify a pattern of 
abusive conduct.  Additionally, there is no express “legitimate expression” 
defense.  Courts applying the statute may thus need to consider, in any 
given case, whether the defendant’s speech should be protected on 
constitutional grounds. 
 
4.  Drafting Effective Criminal Legislation 
 
Criminal laws focused on online abuses need to deal with a number 
of issues that many state and federal laws are currently lacking.  The laws 
need to remove requirements of proximity to the victim, and requirements 
of a credible threat of physical harm in order to be effective in 
cyberspace.121  Legislators may want to retain some laws with a credible 
                                                 
117
  Missouri Ann. Stat. § 565.090(1) R.S. Mo. (2009). 
118
  id, § 565.090(1)(3) & (4). 
119
  id., § 565.090(1)(6). 
120
  SUTTON, supra note 114, at 11. 
121
  Schwartz, supra note 19, at 429 (“none of the crimes should require an element of 
proximity to the victim, nor should they include an ‘overt’ or ‘credible’ threat 
requirement”); Goodno, supra note 39, at 136 (“In cyberstalking cases, a statute with a 
credible threat requirement does not protect against electronic communications (such as 
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threat requirement because such laws may be less open to First Amendment 
challenge than laws of more general application.  However, where 
legislators have focused on credible threat provisions, resulting laws will 
have to be supplemented with other regulatory approaches that remedy 
situations where there is no direct and immediate threat to a victim.122   
 
Cyber-abuse laws might also usefully include a requirement of 
repetitive conduct to avoid catching situations where a person feeling 
unconstrained by the online medium acts in a one-time capacity without any 
ongoing intent to threaten or harass another.123  Of course, some of these 
one-time communications can lead to permanent and lasting damage 
because of the global and permanent nature of online information 
disclosures.124  Legislators will need to strike a careful balance to ensure 
that trivial comments are not sanctioned while more damaging one-time 
activities can be appropriately deterred.   
 
There may be a number of ways to achieve this balance.  For 
instance, judges could be asked to focus on the substance of the online 
communication in terms of whether the statements made by the perpetrator 
are likely to cause minor annoyance or major harm to the victim.  A 
comment that someone is “not a nice person” is less egregious than a 
comment that someone is a “slut” or that she “wants to be raped”.  
Legislation could be drafted to give judges discretion to punish one-time 
                                                                                                                            
thousands of e-mail [sic] messages) that are harassing, but do not include an actual 
threat.”); 138 (“A second problem with a credible threat requirement in cyberstalking cases 
is an issue of receipt.  A ‘threat’ suggests a communication directly from the stalker to the 
victim.  But a cyberstalker can easily post terrifying messages without ever being in direct 
contact with the victim or without the victim ever personally receiving the message…. A 
third problem that the credible threat requirement creates in cyberstalking case is that it 
requires the victim to prove that the cyberstalker had the ‘apparent ability’ to carry out 
whatever he threatens.  What if the cyberstalker sends a threatening e-mail [sic] to the 
vicim from across the country?  It would seem that the victim might then have the burden 
to prove that the cyberstalker had the financial ability to buy a plane ticket to travel across 
the country to carry-out [sic] that threat.  Such a requirement is onerous and unnecessary, 
particularly since the victim may not even know the true identity or location of the 
cyberstalker.”). 
122
  See discussion in Part III, infra. 
123
  Schwartz, supra note 19, at 430 (“the applicable actus reus [for cyber-
victimization crimes] should include a requirement of repetitive conduct.  It is important 
that repetition be incorporated for all of the crimes because ‘punishing merely one instance 
of harassing conduct may unjustly penalize one who acts once out of anger, verses one who 
engages in a series of terrifying acts”.); SUTTON, supra note 114, at 11. 
124
  Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [9] (describing permanence 
of information posted online); Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 977 (describing 
use of Internet archives to maintain permanent records of information posted online) 
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offenders in cases where their online communications are particularly 
egregious.  Another approach would be for legislation to require that the 
proscribed conduct should generally be of a repetitive nature, while not 
expressly preventing a judge from sanctioning stand-alone communications 
in appropriate cases.     
 
Legislation aimed at online abuses should also maintain the mens 
rea requirements that currently exist in state legislation.  For example, the 
Nebraska statute described in Part II.A.2 requires willful conduct on the part 
of the perpetrator.125  This may go some way towards mitigating any 
perceived harshness inherent in allowing judges to sanction one-time 
abuses.  Judges might utilize the mens rea requirement to distinguish 
activities that rise to the level of criminal conduct from those resulting from 
a brief burst of anger. 
 
Effective legislation should not require a communication to be sent 
directly to the victim.126  Web technologies including blogs, online social 
networks, wikis, and other online discussion forums are extremely popular.  
However, they generally do not involve communications sent directly to 
another.  Rather, communications are posted for the whole world to see, or, 
in a closed network, for a particular community to see, such as a community 
of “Facebook friends”.127  Communications sent directly to another might 
merit special attention, particularly if they involve direct and credible 
threats of harm.  However, direct threats are not the sum total of today’s 
damaging online conduct. 
 
Any attempt to legislate against online abuses must be sensitive to 
First Amendment concerns.  Legislation aimed at prohibiting immediate 
and credible threats is less likely to be unconstitutional than legislation of 
broader application.  In the cases of broader legislation, the First 
Amendment might be accommodated by ensuring that the legislation 
specifies that the speech in question is not constitutionally protected.128  
                                                 
125
  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.03 (2010) (“ Any person who willfully harasses another 
person or a family or household member of such person with the intent to injure, terrify, 
threaten, or intimidate commits the offense of stalking.”) 
126
  Goodno, supra note 39, at 146 (noting problems with current anti-cyberstalking 
statutes in Louisiana and North Carolina in that those statutes require harassing 
communications be sent ‘to another’). 
127
  Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 939 (describing the concept of 
Facebook “friends”). 
128
  Schwartz, supra note 19, at 431-432; see Fla. Stat. § 784.048(1)(b) (2009) 
(“‘Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a 
period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally 
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While it may be difficult to perfectly accommodate the First Amendment, 
free speech concerns should not be used as an argument against protecting 
victims.  In the physical world, statutes have successfully criminalized 
offline analogs to many of today’s online wrongs.129  There is no reason 
why judges cannot continue to draw lines between protected and prohibited 
speech in the online context. 
 
Another factor that might usefully be incorporated into future 
legislation would be the concept of a reasonable person standard relating to 
the victim’s state of mind.130  If criminal liability only arises when a victim 
reasonably fears for his or her safety, this may protect expression that could 
not reasonably be regarded as creating fear or emotional distress in the 
victim’s mind.  Thus, unpleasant but predominantly harmless online gossip 
would be protected, but speech that involves, say, egregious damage to a 
victim’s reputation would be sanctioned.  The Missouri anti-harassment 
legislation passed in the wake of the Megan Meier incident is a good 
example of the incorporation of a concept of the victim’s reasonable 
response to the perpetrator’s actions.131  While reasonable person standards 
can be difficult to apply in practice, they do give the courts some flexibility 
in deciding which conduct to sanction and which conduct should be 
excused.   
  
B.  Tort Law 
 
1.  Online Abuses:  Common Challenges for Tort Law 
 
 Cyberspace interactions pose challenges for tort law, including 
defamation,132 privacy torts,133 and intentional infliction of emotional 
                                                                                                                            
protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’ Such 
constitutionally protected activity includes picketing or other organized protests.”); Fla. 
Stat. § 748.048(1)(d) (2009) (“’Cyberstalk’ means to engage in a course of conduct to 
communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through 
the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, 
causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.”) 
129
  See, for example, statutes discussed in Part II.A.2, supra. 
130
  Goodno, supra note 39, at 139-140 (“Those stalking statutes that have a 
reasonable person standard provide the most successful way to prosecute cyberstalking …. 
The reasonable person standard does not require that the cyberstalker send an explicit 
threat to the victim, nor does it require that the victim prove the cyberstalker had the ability 
to carry it out.  Instead, the standard focuses on the victim and whether it is reasonable for 
her to fear for her safety because of the cyberstalker’s conduct.”) 
131
  Missouri Ann. Stat. § 565.090(1) R.S. Mo. (2009); see discussion in Part II.A.3, 
supra. 
132
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 87 (“Targeted individuals [of online 
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distress.134  The common challenges to all of these torts include the ease 
with which a perpetrator can hide his identity by utilizing a pseudonym and 
anonymizing technologies, making it difficult to locate and identify him.135  
While it is possible to unmask anonymous actors online,136 often much 
damage has been done by the time the actor is identified.137  Unmasking a 
perpetrator of an online abuse may require a court order.  This can be 
expensive and time consuming, outside the budget of many victims of 
cyber-abuses.138 
 
Another practical problem raised by anonymous and pseudonymous 
online communications is the fact that some plaintiffs may use tort law to 
unmask the author of defamatory comments not with a view to proceeding 
                                                                                                                            
abuses] could … pursue general tort claims, such as defamation.  False statements and 
distorted pictures that disgrace plaintiffs or injure their careers constitute defamation per se, 
for which special damages need not be proven.”); Lyrissa Lidsky, Silencing Jon Doe:  
Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L J 855 (2000) (expressing concerns 
that defamation suits will be the obvious actions to combat online abuses and will 
potentially stifle online discourse); Kara Carnley-Murrhee, Sticks & Stones:  When Online 
Anonymous Speech Turns Ugly, UF LAW, 21, 22 (Winter 2010) (citing Lyrissa Lidsky 
describing the ease of bringing defamation actions for objectionable speech online) 
[hereinafter, Sticks and Stones] 
133
  Carnley-Murrhee, Hot Air, supra note 7, at 19 (citing Scott Bauries noting that tort 
actions for invasion of privacy might be a useful approach to cyberbullying) 
134
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 87-88 (“Many victims [of online 
abuses] may have actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  That tort responds 
to ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ by a defendant who intended to cause, or recklessly 
caused, the plaintiff’s severe emotional distress …. Various types of online harassment 
have supported emotional distress claims, including threats of violence, the publication of a 
victim’s sensitive information, and disparaging racial remarks.”); Lyrissa Lidsky, 
Comments on Blog Posting:  New Cyberbullying Case:  D.C. v R.R., March 19, 2010, 
available at http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/03/new-cyberbullying-case-
dc-v-rr.html#comments, last viewed on March 22, 2010 (noting that intentional infliction 
of emotional distress is relevant to new cyberbullying case). 
135
  For example, the TOR anonymizing software:  See 
http://www.torproject.org/overview.html.en#thesolution, last viewed on April 14, 2010 
(“Individuals use Tor to keep websites from tracking them …”); see also FERTIK and 
THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 71 (discussion of anonymizing technologies, including TOR). 
136
  Some examples of “unmasking” litigation:  Columbia Ins Co v SeesCandy.Com, 
185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (attempt to identify anonymous domain name 
cybersquatter); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000) 
(attempt to unmask anonymous online defendants); In re Verizon Internet Services, 257 F. 
Supp 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003) (attempt to unmask anonymous online copyright infringers 
under subpoena provisions in 17 U.S.C. § 512). 
137
  For example, in the Megan Meier case, the victim had already committed suicide 
by the time Lori Drew’s actions were investigated:  See discussion in Part II.A.3, supra. 
138
  Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at 1387 (noting that many victims of online 
defamation, for example, lack the resources to bring suit). 
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with the litigation, but rather with the intention of taking matters into their 
own hands.  Thus, instead of the judicial system working to compensate the 
victim for the harm she suffered, it creates a platform for her to engage in a 
campaign of vigilante justice against the defendant.  Even in situations 
where the victim herself does not intend to use the defendant’s identity to 
retaliate, the unmasking could lead to others engaging in online attacks 
against the defendant.   
 
Basically, any legal action used to identify anonymous speakers runs 
the practical risk of creating a backlash against the speaker, regardless of 
whether the speaker might have a valid defense to a tort action.  Whether or 
not the action goes forward, both the plaintiff and the defendant face a 
potential barrage of new online attacks as a result of the public nature of the 
lawsuit.139  Many of the extra-legal approaches to protecting online 
reputations discussed in Part III do not involve publicity of the original 
abusive incident and thus avoid the potential for retaliatory attacks against 
those involved in the original incident.  Any tort-based litigation will also 
involve time and costs that an individual victim may not be in a position to 
bear.140  Along with these burdens, a victim would have to relive the shame 
and humiliation of the abuse in the public record during the proceedings.141  
                                                 
139
  Bartow, supra note 14, at 386-7 (“The targeted law students [in the AutoAdmit 
case] were apparently initially ridiculed on AutoAdmit by people they knew in real space, 
as evidenced by personal information that was disclosed, such as the style or color of 
clothing they wore at a particular location.  But once the women were contextually framed 
as people who deserved to be mocked and punished (mostly because they objected to the ill 
treatment [by commencing litigation]) online strangers mobbed and besieged them as 
well.”); 399 (“[W]hen women complain about harassment, it often escalates.  The 
AutoAdmit administrators seemed to intentionally create a climate the encouraged angry, 
widespread flaming of anyone who complained about the way they were treated by posters 
at the AutoAdmit boards.  This intensified the harassment, which in turn led to the filing of 
the lawsuit.  Subsequently, seemingly everywhere in cyberspace that the AutoAdmit 
lawsuit was discussed where anonymous commenting was allowed, attacks on the two 
women [who were victims of the online abuse] followed.”) 
140
  id; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 90 (noting that many plaintiffs in 
the cyber-harassment context cannot afford the high costs of litigation); Schwartz, supra 
note 19, at 427 (“Furthermore, even if there is an applicable cause of action, the simple 
well-known fact that ‘civil lawsuits are expensive’ will often prevent injured parties from 
bringing suit based on limited resources. As part of her story about being targeted by an 
internet stalker, Cynthia Armistead states: ‘Legal advisors have since told me that there 
was more than enough evidence to obtain a civil judgment, but I did not have the resources 
to pursue a civil case ... when the case was "fresh".’ Armistead's perspective, as someone 
who has directly faced internet abuse, highlights the fact that costs and difficulties of 
maneuvering and understanding the legal system present hurdles that would impede many 
victims from pursuing civil redress.”) 
141
  Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 961 (Noting that plaintiffs are put in 
the awkward position of having to relive the humiliation and embarrassment of the images 
[Draft:  July 31, 2010] Combating Cyber-Victimization 31 
While attempting to punish the wrongdoer, the victim would effectively be 
drawing more attention to the harmful conduct.     
 
Victims of online abuses also face jurisdictional hurdles.  Even in 
cases where the victim knows, or is able to ascertain, the identity of the 
perpetrator, that party may be in another jurisdiction.  Courts in the victim’s 
place of residence may not be able to assert jurisdiction over out-of-state 
defendants.  The costs to the victim of establishing jurisdiction over the 
defendant, often coupled with the costs of identifying the defendant in the 
first place,142 may be prohibitive.  Even in cases where the victim is able to 
identify and assert jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the 
enforcement of an award for damages or an injunction may be another 
matter.  In many cases it will be impossible or impracticable to enforce a 
judgment against a remote or impecunious defendant. 
 
Another general limitation of tort law is the difficulty associated 
with attaching liability to parties who provide forums for posting damaging 
content.  These parties are generally immune from liability for the speech of 
others under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA).143  Section 
230 immunizes providers and users of “interactive computer services” from 
liability for information “provided by another information content 
provider”.144  In other words, where an entity has provided a forum for 
online speech, that entity shall not be held liable for tortious speech of 
others who may use the forum for harmful purposes.145   
 
Section 230 presents challenges for victims of online abuse both 
because it immunizes the most obvious party against whom an injunction 
could be enforced and because it has been very broadly interpreted by the 
                                                                                                                            
as they are entered into the public record as part of the court proceedings.); Lidsky, supra 
note 8, at 1390 (“suing often brings more attention to libelous statements”). 
142
  Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at 1385 (noting uncertain state of law applying to 
the unmasking of anonymous defendants, which would also add to the costs of unmasking 
defendants in interstate cases). 
143
  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated s the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”) 
144
  id.   
145
  Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [39] (“Website operators 
will enjoy immunity from tort liability under section 230(c)(1) of the Communications 
Decency Act …. Section 230 generally frees online service providers from liability related 
to the postings of others.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 6 (“A legal loophole 
in the Communications Decency Act makes it impossible to force a website to remove 
anonymous attacks, no matter how false and damaging they may be.”) 
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courts.146  Online service providers are the most effective points in the chain 
of communications for victims to pursue.  They provide the gateways for 
online discourse.  Victims of online abuses can easily identify them.  They 
generally have the financial resources to compensate victims by way of 
damages and, more importantly, they usually have the technical capacity to 
remove abusive postings and block abusive posters.   
 
However, under § 230, courts have immunized online service 
providers from defamation and associated liability for extremely egregious 
conduct, including comments posted by those with whom the ISP may have 
a close contractual relationship.147  Further, the near-absolute immunity148 
of online service providers under § 230 has had the practical effect of 
preventing courts from engaging in meaningful discussions of the standard 
of care that might be expected of these service providers absent the statutory 
immunity.149  While § 230 immunizes intermediaries and disincentivizes 
them from monitoring online postings, a victim may effectively have no 
legal remedy at all in cases where an anonymous poster cannot be found.  
There will be no action available against the intermediary and no way of 
bringing an action against the original poster of the abusive content.150 
 
2.  Defamation 
                                                 
146
  Zeran v America Online, 129 F. 3d 327 (4th Cir 1997) (immunizing Internet 
service provider from false and defamatory comments posted by others even in 
circumstances where it had knowledge of the postings and had not acted swiftly to remove 
them, because of a broad application of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act); 
Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that America Online was not 
liable for comments posted by a commentator it had contracted with to make sensationalist 
comments on its services because of the application of § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act). 
147
  Blumenthal v Drudge, supra note 132. 
148
  Internet service provider has not been absolute as a result of the application of § 
230 of the Communications Decency Act.  In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando 
Valley v Roommates.com, 521 F. 3d 1157 (9th Cir, 2008), an online service provider was 
held liable for information that it had created in part.  See also Citron, Mainstreaming 
Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [39] (“Section 230 generally frees online service providers 
from liability related to the postings of others.  This safe harbor is inapplicable, however, if 
the website operator helps create the content enabling the criminal activity.  The anti-
abortion group running the Nuremberg Files site exemplifies a party with no immunity 
under section 230.”) 
149
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 116-117 (“[The] efforts to read a 
sweeping immunity into § 230 despite its language and purpose have prevented the courts 
from exploring what standard of care ought to apply to ISPs and website operators.”) 
150
  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 65 (“[W]hen the original author cannot 
be found, the website’s refusal to act leaves the victim without any remedy:  the false 
content stays online, forever staining the victim’s reputation.”) 
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Defamation law only protects victims against false statements that 
may harm their reputations.151  Many online statements are true, even if 
unpleasant or embarrassing.  Many are also statements of opinion which are 
not typically actionable.152  Even where the comments are true, the victim in 
bringing an action puts the defendant to proof on the public record of the 
truth of the comments.  In many cases this could be very awkward for the 
plaintiff.  For example, a defendant may be required to prove that a plaintiff 
is, in fact, a “slut”.  Even bringing evidence of more innocuous things, like 
proof that the plaintiff was overweight, could be highly embarrassing to the 
plaintiff. 
 
Despite these practical limitations, defamation law – like all laws 
impacting social conduct - serves an important expressive function that 
helps to guide conduct between individuals online.153  Thus, even the 
possibility of a small volume of online defamation actions may serve a 
larger regulatory purpose in terms of expressing social values more broadly.  
If we remain aware of the limitations of defamation as an enforcement 
mechanism, we might nevertheless accept its important expressive 
functions.   
                                                 
151
  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 558(a) (requiring a “false and defamatory 
statement” as an element of a defamation action); § 559 (“A communication is defamatory 
if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”). 
152
  id., at § 566 (“A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the 
form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the 
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.”);Lidsky, John Doe, 
supra note 8, at 1382 (“A statement can only be defamatory if it asserts or implies 
objective facts about the plaintiff; otherwise, it will be deemed constitutionally protected 
opinion.”) 
153
  Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at 1390 (noting that a defamation action can 
serve the function of creating a fear of being unmasked in other potential defendants, and 
thus can impact online behaviors with respect to parties outside the litigation process); 
NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX, 104-105 (2008) (“[L]aw often serves an 
expressive or symbolic function above and beyond regulating or providing incentives for 
conduct.  Antidiscrimination law, for example, may have symbolic importance beyond 
whatever discriminatory conduct it actually proscribes.  In enacting and applying such law, 
Congress and the courts effectively express our society’s official condemnation of 
discrimination based on race and various other classifications.  Similarly, the law might 
forbid certain market transactions, such as selling body parts or children for adoption, not 
merely to avoid harmful consequences that might ensue but to make a statement about 
human dignity.  Laws that protect endangered species, forbid hate speech, and require 
recycling also have important symbolic dimensions over and above their regulation of 
conduct per se.  Such laws give vent to and help crystallize collective understandings and 
norms.  In turn, by giving legal imprimatur to certain values, they shape future perceptions 
and choices.”) 
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3.  Privacy Torts 
 
 The American privacy torts were developed at a time well before the 
age of electronic communications technologies.154  The laws are focused 
largely on reasonable expectations of privacy drawn from paradigms 
involving physical space.155  One may have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy behind a locked door but may not have such an expectation in a 
public street.  In the electronic sphere, these expectations break down.  Is a 
Facebook page more like a public forum or a private space?  While a 
Facebook user may exert some control over who accesses her profile, surely 
more people will access that profile than her private house.  An individual 
Facebook user may not know her Facebook “friends” as well as she knows 
people she invites into her own home.  It is not clear how much privacy she 
actually expects from her online relationships. 
 
 Although different states vary on privacy protections, most maintain 
some variations on the four privacy torts identified by Dean Prosser in 
1960.156  These torts are:  (a) intrusion into seclusion;157 (b) public 
disclosure of private facts;158 (c) false light publicity;159 and, (d) commercial 
misappropriation of name or likeness.160  None of these torts is an obvious 
                                                 
154
  Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [3] (“Privacy tort law is a 
product of prior centuries’ hazards.  In the late nineteenth century, snap cameras and 
recording devices provided a cheap way to capture others’ private moments without 
detection.  The penny press profited from the publication of revealing photographs and 
gossip about people’s personal lives.”) 
155
  Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 
HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 2 (2007) (“[P]rivacy is usually a 
function of the physical space in which the purportedly private activity occurred.”); 3 
(“Traditionally, privacy has been inextricably linked to physical space.”) 
156
  Dean Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL L REV 383 (1960). 
157
  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B (“One who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or 
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”) 
158
  id., § 652D (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of 
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter 
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is 
not of legitimate concern to the public.”) 
159
  id, § 652E(“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places 
the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of 
his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to 
a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to 
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.”) 
160
  id., § 652C (“One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness 
[Draft:  July 31, 2010] Combating Cyber-Victimization 35 
match for the kinds of conduct examined in this article.   
 
Unpleasant comments about another, whether directed to that other, or 
directed to a general audience, will generally not be an intrusion into 
another’s seclusion.  The intrusion tort is based on notions of intrusion into 
a person’s private physical space, rather than intrusions into a person’s 
mental state.161  The intrusion tort would generally cover cases where 
someone has entered another’s private domain without invitation.  It would 
be difficult to apply the concept to unpleasant comments made in online 
forums.162   
 
While some commentators have argued that it would not be much of 
a stretch for courts to extend the tort to conduct like hacking people’s 
password protected email accounts,163 there is as yet no judicial authority on 
point.164  Another potential limitation of the intrusion tort, even if it were 
extended to online conduct, is that it would likely only apply to intrusions 
into the plaintiff’s own private online spaces, such as the plaintiff’s email 
account or Facebook page.  It would be difficult to argue that the plaintiff 
could make out an intrusion claim where the defendant had simply 
published unpleasant information about her online without specifically 
impacting on any area of the plaintiff’s own “online space”. 
 
 The public disclosure of private facts tort is also problematic.  This 
tort deals with the publication of private and non-newsworthy information 
disclosure of which would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person”.165  
This tort may apply to some online abuses, but it is not clear where the line 
would be drawn in terms of identifying sufficiently offensive information.  
Courts have generally set the bar relatively high and have imposed a 
                                                                                                                            
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”) 
161
  Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [25] (“Plaintiffs cannot 
bring intrusion into seclusion claims because online postings do not involve invasions of a 
place that the plaintiff understands as private.”) 
162
  id. 
163
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 88 (“Online mobs could face intrusion 
claims for hacking into password protected e-mail accounts containing private 
correspondence and conducting denial-of-service attacks to shut down personal blogs and 
websites.”) 
164
  In fact, Professor Citron cites a case of an intrusion claim involving a creditor 
making intrusive phone calls as an example of the extension of the tort away from activities 
by the defendant that involve the defendant’s physical presence in the plaintiff’s personal 
space:  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 88, n. 4 (citing Donnel v Lara, 703 S.W. 
2d 257, 260 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)). 
165
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 87. 
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significant burden on plaintiffs to prove offense.166  While some online 
communications may meet this test, others will not.  For example, 
photographs of an individual in a sexually explicit and compromising 
situation may be highly offensive, while comments that a person is fat or 
slutty, or simply the posting of generally unflattering photographs with 
unpleasant commentary may not be sufficiently offensive.   
 
 False light publicity is also problematic online.167  It might be 
regarded as the little brother of defamation law in the sense that it 
proscribes publication of information that is not, strictly speaking, false, but 
that may present an individual in a false light.  Litigants will be forced to 
argue on the public record about the truth or falsity of unpleasant comments 
and the extent to which recipients of the information formed a false 
impression of the plaintiff.  As with the public disclosure tort, the false light 
publicity tort – when coupled with the other disadvantages of litigation – is 
only a limited answer to online abuse.   
 
 It is unlikely that the misappropriation tort would apply to much 
online harassment because this tort requires the defendant to have made an 
unauthorized commercial profit from the plaintiff’s name or likeness.168  
Most online abuse is non-commercial.  It is possible that a plaintiff might 
bring an appropriation action against that the operator of a web service that 
made money from encouraging personally hostile discourse.  For example, 
a service like AutoAdmit or Juicy Campus169 – if it adopted a commercial 
model based on advertising or membership fees and then facilitated abusive 
online discussions - might be said to be making a commercial profit from 
another’s name or likeness.  However, a court may require that the 
defendant itself be the person who appropriated the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.  Where the defendant has rather provided a forum for others to 
                                                 
166
  Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 932 (“The [public disclosure] tort also 
generally requires that the private facts in question must have been shameful by an 
objective standard which is often difficult to prove.”); Jonathan B Mintz, The Remains of 
Privacy’s Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MARYLAND LAW 
REVIEW 425, 439 (1996) (“Whether a fact is private by nature - that is, whether a 
reasonable person would feel seriously aggrieved by its disclosure - is the subject of some 
disagreement.”) 
167
  Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [25] (“False light claims 
require proof of plaintiff’s placement in a false light.  They do not apply when … leaked 
information causes mischief because it is true.”) 
168
  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C (“One who appropriates to his own use or 
benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy.”)  
169
  Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 11-14 (discussing moral responsibility of 
services like Juicy Campus for harmful postings by their members). 
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appropriate names and likenesses for abusive discourse and has profited 
from providing that forum, a court may hold that the elements of the tort are 
not satisfied.170  In any event, § 230 of the CDA would immunize most 
providers of these forums from any such liability. 
  
4.  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
 
 The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort may be more 
promising than the other torts.  This tort requires a finding of extreme or 
outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant that caused, or was 
intended to cause, severe emotional distress.171  Some courts have been 
willing to find for plaintiffs where a defendant exploits a power disparity 
between the parties or otherwise takes advantage of a vulnerable plaintiff.172  
It may be easier to convince a court of such a power disparity or 
vulnerability in online abuse cases than to focus on the content of the 
communication, which is generally necessary in defamation and some of the 
privacy torts.173   
 
While it is difficult to determine by contemporary social standards what 
might satisfy the extreme or outrageous conduct limb of the tort, many 
cases of cyberbullying and cyber harassment will have powerful emotional 
effects on their victims.  For example, a recent situation involving the 
“Casual Encounters” board on Craigslist resulted in a teenager being 
inundated with pornographic messages and confronted by men at her place 
of work as a result of an online posting that she had rape fantasies and 
enjoyed pornography.174  Even though the perpetrator’s conduct involved 
merely posting a message on Craigslist, his action – coupled with the 
substance of the message and the harmful results – may amount to extreme 
or outrageous conduct.  Although the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress action may theoretically be a promising avenue for individuals 
harmed by cyber abuses, this tort still suffers from the same practical 
limitations as the other torts in terms of time, cost, jurisdictional challenges, 
                                                 
170
  But see Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [35-43] (suggesting 
the development of an action for tortuous enablement of criminal or tortuous conduct by 
website operators). 
171
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 87-8; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
46(1)(1965). 
172
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 88 (“Courts are more willing to 
consider conduct ‘outrageous’ if the defendant exploited an existing power disparity 
between the parties or knowingly took advantage of a vulnerable plaintiff”). 
173
  For example, defamation actions and false light publicity claims focus, at least in 
part, on the content of the communications made by the defendant about the plaintiff. 
174
  Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra note 7, at [15]. 
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and potential increased public humiliation for either or both parties.    
 
C.  Civil Rights Law 
  
Professor Citron has recently suggested that a civil rights agenda 
might be developed to combat certain cyber abuses.175  Civil rights laws 
include doctrines against race discrimination that might interfere with a 
victim’s ability to make a living and laws that criminalize threats of force 
designed to intimidate or interfere with a person’s employment based on 
that person’s race, religion or national origin.176  In other words, civil rights 
law addresses the kinds of conduct typically described as harassment in the 
sense that victims are targeted because of their membership in a particular 
protected class.177  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
gender discrimination as a result of intimidation, threats or coercion aimed 
at interfering with employment opportunities.178  While this law focuses on 
employment opportunities, many online abuses aimed at women and 
minorities do prevent members of those groups from engaging in 
employment or “making a living” because many people’s businesses are 
now conducted wholly or partly online.179 
 
Civil rights suits entail some advantages including easing the costs 
of litigation for victims of online harassment,180 as well as reaching wrongs 
                                                 
175
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 89 (“A meaningful response to abusive 
online mobs would include the enforcement of existing civil rights laws …”) 
176
  id., at 91-92 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 18 U.S.C. §245(b)(2)(C) respectively).  
177
  See discussion in Part I.A.3, supra. 
178
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 92 (“Gender discrimination that 
interferes with a person’s ability to make a living can be pursued under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which sanctions those who intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or 
attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce someone with the purpose of interfering with 
employment opportunities due to their gender.”) 
179
  id. (“Destructive online crowds intimidate women and members of racial and 
religious minorities, preventing them from ‘making a living’ due to discriminatory animus.  
Because the Internet fuses our public and private lives and is a workplace for many, online 
attacks on vulnerable individuals often interfere with their equal right to pursue work.  For 
instance, women who stop blogging in the face of an online mob’s attack lose advertising 
revenue and opportunities for advancement….Online mobs also conduct denial-of-service 
attacks to shut down blogs that generate income for women and racial minorities.  They 
spread damaging statements to employers and professors for whom victims may work in 
order to interfere with their employment opportunities.”); Madden and Smith, supra note 
57, at 3 (noting that 12% of employed adults now report that they need to promote 
themselves online). 
180
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 92 (“[C]ivil rights laws have attractive 
remedial features.  Because damages may be hard to prove and quantify, and because many 
plaintiffs cannot afford to litigate based on principle alone, the high cost of litigation often 
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that would otherwise escape criminal or tort liability.181  However, while 
Citron’s suggested civil rights agenda is well reasoned it remains untried.  
Adopting a broader civil rights agenda aimed at online abuses would 
confront many of the same problems as extending tort and criminal law to 
cover online abuses.  Enforcing authorities, including judges and, in some 
cases the United States Attorney General,182 would have to be willing to act 
against online abusers.  These authorities may be reticent to do so absent a 
clearer mandate.  Additionally, civil rights laws, along with tort and 
criminal law, raise problems of identifying often anonymous defendants.   
 
Civil rights law, if applied online, might help some groups targeted 
by online abusers, such as women, and racial and religious minorities.  
However, other sets of common victims, such as children, are unlikely to be 
covered here unless an individual victim also happens to fall into a 
statutorily protected class.  In other words, civil rights law might provide 
some protections against cyber-harassment, but not necessarily against 
cyberbullying.  As noted above, cyberbullies generally target individuals for 
reasons outside membership in a protected class.183  Bullies may target 
people who they perceive as a threat, or who they regard as weak – 
potentially including people who are poor, inarticulate, overweight, or 
socially inept.  None of these traits would fall within the umbrella of civil 
rights protection.   
 
III.  Extra-Legal Approaches to Online Wrongs 
 
A. The Need for a Multi-Modal Approach 
 
Because of the limitations inherent in the legal system, a broader multi-
modal regulatory approach is necessary to combat online abuses.  The idea 
of combining regulatory modalities in cyberspace is not new.184  However, 
                                                                                                                            
deters the filing of general torts suits.  The awards of attorney’s fees possible under many 
civil rights statutes might make some cases affordable to pursue.”)  
181
  id. (“[C]ivil rights suits may reach wrongs that would otherwise escape liability.  
These include victims’ rights to be free from economic intimidation and cyber harassment 
based on race and gender.”) 
182
  id. (noting that the Attorney General can file civil suits for injunctive relief under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
183
  See discussion in Part I.A.2, supra. 
184
  Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:  What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV 
L REV 501 (1999) (suggesting four regulatory modalities for cyberspace:  legal rules, social 
norms, market forces, and system architecture); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of 
Privacy, 1 VANDERBILT J ENT L & PRAC 56, 62-3 (1999) (suggesting the same four norms 
of regulation for online privacy); Lipton, We the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at 925 (“This 
Article argues that legal regulation alone is unlikely to solve society’s video privacy 
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web 2.0 technologies increase the need for a complex interplay of 
regulatory approaches in order to identify, and facilitate the development of, 
appropriate online behaviors.185  Relevant regulatory modalities will likely 
include social norms,186 system architecture,187 market forces,188 public 
education,189 and the use of private institutions.190 
 
In global online communities laws must interact with other 
regulatory modalities to achieve a comprehensive approach to combating 
abuses.  Legislators and judges will learn much from observing the 
development of market solutions,191 technological solutions and emerging 
                                                                                                                            
problems.  It advocates a multi-modal approach that combines six regulatory modalities: 
legal rules, social norms, system architecture, market forces, public education, and 
private/non-profit institutions.”). 
185
  See, for example, LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 (full text available at 
http://pdf.codev2.cc/Lessig-Codev2.pdf, last viewed on April 20, 2010), at 5 (“Cyberspace 
demands a new understanding of how regulation works. It compels us to look beyond the 
traditional lawyer’s scope—beyond laws, or even norms. It requires a broader account of 
‘regulation,’ and most importantly, the recognition of a newly salient regulator. That 
regulator is the obscurity in this book’s title—Code.”) [hereinafter, CODE]. 
186
  Katherine Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A Theory of 
Willpower Norms, 57 RUTGERS L REV 1235,1238 (2005) (“Social norms are primarily 
understood as means to coordinate the behavior of individuals in a social group. Thus, 
norms may help to solve coordination problems – by determining how pedestrians pass one 
another on the street - and collective action problems – by stigmatizing littering - when 
individually rational behavior leads to collectively undesirable results.”); Jacqueline 
Lipton, Copyright’s Twilight Zone:  Digital Copyright Lessons from the Vampire 
Blogosphere, forthcoming MARYLAND LAW REVIEW, 2010 (discussing the development of 
norms of authorship and fan use of copyright works online); Jacqueline Lipton, What 
Blogging Might Teach About Cybernorms, forthcoming AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
JOURNAL, 2010 (discussing the development and identification of norms in the 
blogosphere); Steven Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix 
Culture, 157 PENN. L. REV. 1869 (2009) (discussing the role of norms in regulating online 
fan fiction and remix communities); Mark Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll:  
What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 
BERKELEY TECH L J 651 (2006) (discussing the role of norms in regulating copyrights in 
certain sectors of the music industry). 
187
  LESSIG, CODE, supra note 185, at 5; Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The 
Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEXAS L REV 553 
(1998) (describing how digital technology can be utilized as a form of regulatory 
mechanism for online conduct). 
188
  Ann Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF L REV 1231, 1253 (2001) (“Markets 
constrain behavior through price. If the price of gasoline rises dramatically, people will 
drive less.”) 
189
  Lipton, We, the Paparazzi, supra note 4, at Part IV.E. 
190
  id., at Part IV.F. 
191
 For example, reputationdefender.com, last viewed on May 20, 2010; 
youdiligence.com, last viewed on May 20, 2010; udiligence.com, last viewed on May 20, 
2010 (examples of private online reputation management services). 
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social norms192 that impact online behavior.  Participants in online 
communities will also learn something from a legislature’s willingness to 
legislate to proscribe certain conduct.  Public education, both through news 
stories and other means – such as publicly or privately funded education 
initiatives – are also an important part of the framework.  Appropriately 
tailored educational initiatives will assist in the development of online 
norms.   
 
 This Part examines several extra-legal regulatory approaches that 
could impact ways in which people interact online.  It focuses on regulatory 
modalities that can empower victims to control their own reputations 
online.  It also suggests ways in which public and private funding might be 
usefully funneled into educational initiatives to assist individuals in 
preventing online harms, abuse reporting hotlines, and programs that 
facilitate relevant industry self-regulation.  One advantage of focusing on 
extra-legal initiatives is that their development is less likely to be hindered 
by concerns about the First Amendment than legal developments.  This is 
because private actors such as reputation management services and private 
education providers are not generally subject to First Amendment 
guarantees.193   
 
B. Empowering Victims to Combat Online Abuses 
 
1. Reputation Management Techniques 
 
“Your online reputation is your reputation.  Period.” 194 
 
A key to protecting individuals from online abuses is to empower those 
individuals to protect themselves without needing to resort to the legal 
system.  There are a variety of ways in which individuals can guard their 
own reputations online.  Some methods involve learning to control 
information that an individual releases about herself on the Internet – such 
as personal anecdotes and photographs.  Educating individuals about the 
risks of disclosing private information online is an important aspect of 
protecting online reputation.  For example, individuals can be encouraged 
                                                 
192
   See, for example, ownwhatyouthink.com, last viewed on May 20, 2010 (campaign 
to promote more accountable and responsible online discourse). 
193
  Constitution of the United States, Amendment I (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”) 
194
  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 16. 
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to use maximum privacy protections on services like Facebook195 and to 
ensure that they have sufficient security measures installed on their personal 
computers to prevent others from accessing their personal information.  
Individuals can also be trained to build positive online content about 
themselves as a form of online insurance to prevent negative content from 
making it into the first page of search results about them. 
 
 Better educating people about the risks inherent in releasing their 
personal information online is unquestionably important.  However, bigger 
problems occur when the individual’s friends or acquaintances disseminate 
the harmful information.  While a potential victim may secure her own 
computer and may be careful about what she discloses about herself online, 
she has very little control over what others disclose about her.  She also has 
very little control over attacks directed specifically to her.   
 
 Individuals now have to be vigilant not only about what they 
disclose about themselves online, but also in monitoring what others may 
be disclosing about them.196  Individuals may also need to be aware of 
currently available ways to combat damaging content about them.  This 
may involve learning how to conduct a personal reputation audit197 and 
asking providers of online forums to monitor, police, and remove damaging 
content.198  It may also involve knowing how to use other online tools, such 
as astroturfing and search engine optimization to repair damage.199   
 
Astroturfing involves seeding the Internet with positive or neutral 
content generated by the individual herself in an attempt to drown out the 
abusive content.200  Search engine optimization techniques involve the 
                                                 
195
  In fact, Facebook has recently simplified its privacy settings to better enable its 
users to make use of its privacy-protecting technologies:  Mark Zuckerberg, Making 
Control Simple, THE FACEBOOK BLOG, May 26, 2010 (available at 
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=391922327130, last viewed on June 7, 2010). 
196
 Robert McGarvey, Is Bad Taste the New Taste?  Social Media is Changing Our 
Sense of What’s Acceptable – and What’s Not, THINK 25, 26-27 (Spring/Summer, 2010) 
(describing situation where an Ohio executive found out that an old friend had posted 
online a photo of him in a drunken stupor from his youth, and the steps he attempted to 
take to have the photo de-tagged from social networking websites); Madden and Smith, 
supra note 57, at 2-3 (noting that individuals are indeed becoming more vigilant over time 
about self-monitoring and observation of information available about others online). 
197
  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at Chapter 10. 
198
  Bartow, supra note 14, at 415 (noting that some people who run online forums do 
a lot of policing on their own initiative). 
199
  id., at 426-7. 
200
  id. (describing the use of astroturfing by reputation management services such as 
ReputationDefender).  The term “astroturfing” has arguably begun to take on negative 
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manipulation of search engine results so that positive or neutral information 
is prioritized in searches above harmful information.201  Many of these tools 
are currently utilized by private online reputation management services, but 
there is no reason individuals cannot not learn how to use them without 
needing to pay the fees charged by the private services.202  Some literature 
is now available to assist individuals to learn strategies that commercial 
reputation management services have typically utilized.203 
 
 Another mechanism for protecting some aspects of an individual’s 
online reputation is available under the notice-and-takedown provisions of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).204  These provisions allow 
a copyright holder to send a notice to a website operator requesting removal 
of material that infringes a copyright.  If the operator complies with the 
notice, it can avoid copyright infringement liability.205  The effectiveness of 
this technique in the hands of a private individual will depend on the extent 
to which the individual actually holds copyright in damaging text and 
images about her.  In many cases, such materials will have been generated 
by third parties.206  Thus, the victim will not have a copyright claim that 
could support the use of the DMCA.207 
 
 The ability of an individual to make use of any of the techniques 
described here will depend on her awareness of the techniques.  One of the 
problems for victims of online abuses has been lack of awareness of how to 
protect one’s own reputation online, outside of resorting to the law or 
                                                                                                                            
connotations in the sense that some people may now associate it with conduct like seeding 
the Internet with false political information.  However, in the absence of a better term, 
“astroturfing” is utilized in this paper in reference to seeding any type of positive or neutral 
information about an individual in an attempt to protect her reputation online. 
201
  Bartow, supra note 14, at 427 (describing use of search engine optimization 
techniques by private reputation management services). 
202
  id., at 421 (“It is doubtful that any reputation defense service offers clients 
anything that they cannot do for themselves if they have a basic understanding of 
applicable laws, of the way that search engines function, and of the vulnerability of search 
engines to targeted manipulation.”) 
203
  For example the founder and general counsel of ReputationDefender have 
released a book detailing some strategies for individuals to protect their own online 
reputations:  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1. 
204
  17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
205
  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
206
  For example, a person who takes an embarrassing photograph of the victim will 
generally hold copyright in the photograph:  DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF 
REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET, 184 (2007) (“Copyright in 
a photo is owned initially by the person who takes the photo, not by the person whose 
photo is taken.”) 
207
  id. 
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engaging the services of a private reputation management company.  While 
private reputation management services unquestionably have a useful place 
in protecting people’s online reputations, they are motivated by profits and 
they can charge high fees208 for doing a number of things that private 
individuals could do on their own if they knew how.209  Cynically, one 
might also argue that private reputation management services actually 
benefit from online abuses and it is in their own commercial interests that 
online abuses continue to some extent.210 
 
2. Education 
 
 The increased ability of private individuals to utilize effective 
methods to protect their own reputations online might put more pressure on 
private reputation management services to develop new products and 
services, or to price their services more competitively.  The question 
remains how best to empower private individuals to protect their 
reputations online.  Clearly, some level of public education would be 
useful.  Education might be government funded and targeted at schools and 
other public institutions211 – like libraries and universities.  It may also be 
that private non-profit organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation212 and the Electronic Privacy Information Center,213 will play 
an increasingly important role.  Education can focus both on empowering 
victims to protect their reputations against online attacks and on training 
participants in online communities to behave in a socially acceptable 
manner more generally. 
                                                 
208
  Bartow, supra note 14, at 423-426 (describing fees charged by 
ReputationDefender for its various services). 
209
  id., at 421 (“It is doubtful that any reputation defense service offers clients 
anything that they cannot do for themselves if they have a basic understanding of 
applicable laws, of the way that search engines function, and of the vulnerability of search 
engines to targeted manipulation.”); FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, Chapters 10-13 
(describing ways in which private individuals and small businesses can act to protect their 
own online reputations). 
210
  Bartow, supra note 14, at 419 (“[T]he greater the quantity of sexual harassment 
toward affluent victims that appears on the Internet, the wealthier reputation defense 
services can become.”).  Of course, one could make similar arguments about the home 
security system industry.  This industry unquestionably profits from home burglaries.  
However, that is not to say that they condone the conduct of burglars. 
211
  While government regulation of speech generally raises First Amendment 
concerns, the government is generally able to attach speech-restrictive provisions to 
funding legislation without running afoul of the First Amendment:  United States v 
American Library Associaton Inc, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding legislation that required 
Internet filtering as a condition of libraries accepting government funding).  
212
  See www.eff.org, last viewed on April 20, 2010. 
213
  See www.epic.org, last viewed on April 20, 2010. 
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 A number of private organizations already provide information 
about online harms as well as providing tools for addressing them.  Many of 
these organizations focus on protecting children from online predators and 
bullies.  For example, NetSmartz provides information to parents, 
guardians, educators, law enforcement authorities and children about 
staying safe on the Internet.214  NetSmartz also offers free multimedia 
safety presentations that can be used in classrooms and other communities.  
Its website also links to the Internet Crimes Against Children website,215 a 
government sponsored educational initiative to protect children online. 
 
 Another service aimed at protecting children online is 
GetNetWise,216 which provides information, advice and free online tools 
for keeping children safe online.  It contains an inventory of suggested 
software tools parents might utilize to protect their children as well as 
critiques of the available software options.  It also provides a suggested 
contract that parents can enter into with their children containing guidelines 
to help children stay safe in their online interactions.217 
 
C. A Critique of Existing Commercial Reputation Management 
Services 
 
While an increasing number of services provide free information and 
tools for combating online abuses, some of the most well known services 
are the for-profit reputation management services like ReputationDefender, 
Reputation Hawk, and YouDiligence.  Private reputation management 
services raise some practical concerns, despite the useful function they 
serve.  As noted in the previous section, reputation management services 
offer a variety of options for protecting individual reputations online.  They 
will monitor an individual’s online reputation218 typically for a monthly 
fee.219  They then provide monthly reports to a client summarizing 
information about the client available online.220 
                                                 
214
  See www.netsmartz.org, last viewed on May 20, 2010. 
215
  See www.icactraining.org, last viewed on May 20, 2010. 
216
  See http://kids.getnetwise.org, last viewed on May 20, 2010. 
217
  See http://kids.getnetwise.org/tools/toolscontracts, last viewed on July 8, 2010. 
218
  Focusing on popular services like MySpace and Facebook:  See Bartow, supra 
note 14, at 424 (“ReputationDefender claims it will monitor blogs and sites like MySpace, 
Facebook, Xenga, Bebo, Flickr, LiveJournal, and many others for any material that might 
be damaging or distressing to a client …”) 
219
  id., at 424 (“The SEARCH part of [ReputationDefender’s] service requires 
payment of a subscription fee, which costs $14.95 per month, with discounts to people who 
sign up for one or more years at a time.”).  YouDiligence currently charges between $9.99 
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 If the service detects information that the client objects to, the 
service will offer to remove the damaging content from the Internet at a 
charge relating to each piece of information the client wants to destroy.221  
The information does not have to be untrue to be targeted by the service at 
the client’s request.222  However, many reputation management services 
now focus on the removal of slanderous or damaging information, and 
refrain from removing much information that is true or newsworthy.223  
Most reputation management services regard their techniques for sanitizing 
a person’s online reputation as “proprietary”224 and do not disclose those 
techniques publicly.225  However, their methods likely include:  (a) using 
notice and takedown procedures from the DMCA;226 (b) contacting blogs 
                                                                                                                            
and $14.99 per month for its monitoring services:  see www.youdiligence.com, last viewed 
on May 20, 2010. 
220
  Bartow, supra note 14, at 423 (citing ReputationDefender’s “SEARCH” process). 
221
  id., at 424 (“The DESTROY aspect of the enterprise costs $ 29.95 per piece of 
unwanted information, with no guarantee of positive or sustainable results.”) 
222
  id. (noting that ReputationDefender does not require information to be inaccurate, 
harassing or defamatory in order to remove it; and that the service is prepared “to sanitize 
any inconvenient truths”); at 425 (“ReputationDefender is also willing to mask or bury 
accounts of mainstream news stories even if they are true.”) 
223
  ReputationDefender, Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
http://www.reputationdefender.com/faq/, last viewed on July 8, 2010  (“Our removal 
(‘Destroy’) service is designed to help individuals regain control over unintentionally 
posted or outdated personal information disclosed to the public Internet, and address 
potentially libelous, slanderous, defamatory or invasive information about them We do not 
target news/media articles for removal. Nor do we seek to get government records removed 
from the Internet. We believe that individuals have the right to express ideas freely, and we 
support the freedom of the press to inquire fully about issues of legitimate public interest. 
Given that, we reserve the right to refuse any requests that we believe conflict with these 
fundamental values. But we also believe that it is the right of individuals to know what 
others are saying about them, and for private individuals to protect themselves from 
unintentional, inappropriate, or illegal intrusions of their privacy.”) 
224
  Bartow, supra note 14, at 421 (noting ReputationDefender’s reference to its 
techniques as being “proprietary”). 
225
  id., at 425 (“ReputationDefender refuses to disclose the exact nature of its so-
called destruction tools, and presumably its competitors do as well.”).  More recently, 
ReputationDefender has disclosed a number of its reputation management techniques:  
FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1. 
226
  Bartow, supra note 14, at 421 (discussing use of the notice and take-down 
provisions of copyright law by online reputation management services); see also discussion 
in Part III.B, supra.  In an interview with David Thompson, general counsel of 
ReputationDefender, he stated that ReputationDefender does not actually use the notice and 
take-down provisions of copyright law in practice (interview with David Thompson at the 
3rd Annual Privacy Law Scholars’ Conference, George Washington Law School, 
Washington, D.C., June 3, 2010). 
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and other web hosts and asking them to remove damaging information;227 
(c) astroturfing the Internet with newly manufactured neutral or positive 
information about their clients;228 and, (d) engaging in search engine 
optimization techniques to ensure that neutral and positive information 
about their clients is prioritized in search results.229 
 
 These services provide a number of advantages over legal solutions 
to online abuses, including the fact that several of them now have many 
years of experience with reputation management and have established solid 
working relationships with websites that host harmful communications.230  
The use of private commercial services does not raise the specter of a First 
Amendment challenge.  As noted in Part II, many laws directed at curtailing 
online speech may raise First Amendment concerns and may be open to 
constitutional challenge.231  Reputation management services also avoid 
many of the practical problems associated with litigation including 
jurisdictional challenges and difficulties identifying a defendant in the first 
place.  A commercial service does not need to identify or locate a potential 
defendant in order to engage in astroturfing or search engine optimization.  
Resort to a reputation management service also avoids drawing public 
attention to the damaging content.232  Harmful content can simply be 
unobtrusively de-prioritized in search engine results. 
                                                 
227
  Bartow, supra note 14, at 425 (“In addition to utilizing the notice and take-down 
procedures of copyright law, another of ReputationDefender’s vaunted proprietary 
techniques is apparently to send e-mails to blogs and websites hosting information that its 
clients want to disappear.”) 
228
  id., at 426-427 (“[Astroturf] is Internet content that springs from artificial grass 
roots (hence the name) and is engineered to falsely appear as originating from diverse and 
geographically distributed, independently acting individuals.  Reputation defense services 
may be seeding the world wide web with astroturfing websites and blogs of their own 
creations to create a faux chorus of noise that drowns out speakers that their clients wish 
would ‘sod off,’ whether for socially good reasons, or for bad.”) 
229
  id., at 427 (“Another avenue open to reputation defense organizations is Search 
Engine Optimizing, which has been characterized by at least one legal scholar as fraud.  It 
is an effort to manipulate search engine results for profit.”); Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 
8, at 1390 (describing services provided by commercial reputation management 
companies). 
230
  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 206 (“Professionals have built thousands 
of websites and know exactly how to optimize them to rank the highest in Google and other 
search engines.  They often know the right tone to strike and the right balance of links to 
create.  And professionals often have an arsenal of deals with specialized websites that 
allow rapid improvement in search results.”) 
231
  See, for example, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There A Right to Have 
Something to Say?  One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L REV 297, 348-9 
(2004). 
232
  Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 8, at 1390 (“Hiring a reputation management 
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 However, reliance by individuals on these commercial services has 
a number of disadvantages, despite the obvious benefits.  One of the key 
disadvantages relates to cost and equity issues.  Many of the victims of 
online harassment and other abuses will not be able to afford the fees 
charged by these services.233  While engaging a service to monitor one’s 
reputation on the Internet may be relatively affordable,234 paying fees to 
repair one’s online reputation may be prohibitive for many.  Additionally, 
while these commercial services are available – at least to some more 
wealthy people – there may be less pressure on the government to act.  If 
the government thinks the market is handling the problem, government 
agencies may put less effort into investigating and prosecuting the 
abuses.235     
 
The apparent availability of reputation management services may 
also negatively impact the level of monitoring undertaken by those who 
provide online speech forums.  These forum providers are generally 
immunized from tort liability for the speech of others under § 230 of the 
CDA.236  This legislation is a powerful disincentive for online service 
providers to monitor and act against harmful speech.  The perceived 
availability of reputation management services may further disincentivize 
online forum providers from monitoring their own forums.  Service 
providers might assume that they need not monitor their forums because not 
only are they generally immune from legal liability for the speech of their 
contributors, but also if there is a problem, they will receive a notice from a 
reputation management service.  Better yet, the reputation management 
service may simply take care of the problem through astroturfing or search 
engine optimization without requiring any action on the part of the online 
                                                                                                                            
company sometimes provides an attractive alternative to suing for libel because suing often 
brings more attention to the libelous statements.”) 
233
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 105 (“Few free or inexpensive services 
are available for defending one’s online reputation, and the services of groups like 
ReputationDefender are expensive and beyond the means of many victims.”) 
234
  As noted above, the fees for monitoring one’s reputation are typically in the 
ballpark of around $10 to $15 a month:  Bartow, supra note 14, at 424 (noting that 
ReputationDefender charges $14.95 per month to monitor a client’s online reputation). 
235
  id., at 422 (“While it appears that self-help options are available, momentum for 
official intervention can dissipate.  Government actors may decline to assist online 
harassment victims because the more affluent ones can theoretically purchase assistance 
from ReputationDefender or similar services.  They may not see a need to step in and have 
the government provide assistance that could readily be purchased, at least by those who 
can afford it.”) 
236
  See discussion in Part II.B.1, supra. 
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service provider.237  Recent statistics suggest that many online service 
providers will quickly remove harmful information on request.238  
However, it is difficult to gauge how proactive any of these services are in 
removing damaging information absent a formal request to do so. 
 
Another practical limitation of reputation management services is 
that the actions they take to protect their clients’ reputations may backfire 
dramatically.  Most of them will not offer any guarantees of success239 or 
refunds for backlash caused by their activities.240  For example, 
ReputationDefender client, Ronnie Segev, suffered a significant backlash as 
a result of ReputationDefender’s efforts to remove embarrassing content 
about him from a website.241  After ReputationDefender sent a notice to the 
website operator requesting removal of the harmful information,242 a 
                                                 
237
  See discussion in Part III.B, supra. 
238
  Madden and Smith, supra note 57, at 4 (noting that a significant majority of 
people who have sought removal of information about them posted online have been 
successful). 
239
  The disclaimer in YouDiligence’s terms of service is a good example of how little 
these services guarantee in practice.  See YouDiligence.com, Terms of Service, January 5, 
2010, clause 14, available at www.youdiligence.com/yd/TermsOfUse.htm, last viewed on 
May 20, 2010 (“You agree that use of the YouDiligence site and the service is entirely at 
your own risk.  The YouDiligence site and the service are provided on an ‘as is’ or ‘as 
available’ basis, without any warranties of any kind.  All express and implied warranties, 
including, without limitation, the warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular 
purpose, and non-infringement of proprietary rights are expressly disclaimed to the fullest 
extent permitted by law.  YouDiligence disclaims any warranties for the security, 
reliability, timeliness, accuracy, and performance of the YouDiligence site and the service.  
To the fullest extent permissible by law, YouDiligence disclaims any warranties for other 
services on the YouDiligence site or the sites or service, or accessed through any links on 
the YouDiligence site.  To the fullest extent permitted by law, YouDiligence disclaims any 
warranties for viruses or other harmful components in connection with the YouDiligence 
site or the service.”) 
240
  Bartow, supra note 14, at 424 (noting that reputation management services do not 
give guarantees of positive or sustainable results); Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, 
at 105 (“[I]nstead of slowing down an online mob, counter-measures may sustain the life of 
the attacks.  The very purpose of many online attacks is to force victims off the net; the 
mobs are likely to respond with particular venom against a victim who not only stays 
online but tries to fight back.  A victim may plausibly conclude that more people will see 
the defamatory or private material if she responds than if she does not.”) 
241
  id., at 425-427 (discussing the Segev incident). 
242
  id., at 426 (citing the text of ReputationDefender’s message:  “We are writing to 
you today because our client, Ronnie Segev, has told us that he would like the content 
about him on your website to be removed as it is outdated and disturbing to him.  Would 
you be willing to remove or alter the content?  It would mean so much to Mr Segev, and to 
us.  Considerate actions such as these will go a long way to help make the Internet a more 
civil place.”) 
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blogger from the website wrote a scathing post entitled “Ronnie Segev and 
ReputationDefender Can Eat a Dick”.243  
 
Another limitation of private reputation management services is that 
they cannot do much in the face of personal attacks directed at a victim, 
rather than posted publicly online.  The tools utilized by reputation 
management services do not specifically address situations where a person 
is, say, sending harassing and abusive communications directly to a victim.  
In the Megan Meier scenario, for example, where harmful communications 
are directly sent to the victim, there is little that a private reputation 
management service can do.  This may be a situation where legal solutions 
are more appropriate.  Victims of such abuses can, in relevant jurisdictions, 
rely on cyberbullying and cyber harassment laws if police and prosecutors 
are prepared to act on the complaints.244   
 
D. Effective Reputation Management 
 
1.  Enhanced Access to Reputation Management Services 
 
Empowering individuals to fight online abuses themselves requires a 
number of strategies, many of which rely largely on the availability of 
funding and public education.  For example, pro bono legal services could 
be encouraged to take on more online abuse cases if they could be staffed 
and funded to do so.  There is also no reason why more pro bono reputation 
management services could not be developed if government or other 
funding were available.   
 
The development of more pro-bono reputation management services 
and public education initiatives would be a useful supplement to currently 
available commercial reputation management services.  As noted above, 
commercial services are expensive and out of the reach of many victims of 
online abuses.245  At the same time, some of the tools they utilize are 
readily available to private individuals who know how to use them.246  If 
victims of online abuses had better information about some of these tools, 
they could more easily protect themselves online without necessarily 
having to pay for a commercial reputation management service.     
 
                                                 
243
  id. 
244
  See discussion in Part I.A, supra. 
245
  Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 5, at 105 (noting often prohibitive expense 
of utilizing these services) 
246
  FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, Chapters 10-13 (advising individuals and 
small businesses on techniques to self-protect online reputations). 
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If appropriate funding were available, victims might also have the 
option of using a pro bono reputation management service.  Naturally the 
choice to pay for a commercial service would still be available.  If 
individuals were savvier about protecting their own reputations online and 
more pro bono options were available, the commercial services may be 
incentivized to develop even more sophisticated solutions to online abuses.  
They would after all be competing for increasingly technologically 
sophisticated clients with more practical options.  This could ultimately 
lead to the development of new innovations for protecting individual 
reputations.   
 
Access to existing legal remedies for online abuses might also be 
improved if pro bono legal services were better equipped to take on these 
cases.  Many legal clinics and other pro bono services might not deal with 
many of these cases because of unfamiliarity with the relevant laws, or 
assessment of current law as not adequately covering the victims’ harms.247  
A reworking of laws, and increased funding and education to those 
providing pro bono services to victims of online harassment, might usefully 
redress the balance here. 
 
2.  Cyber-Abuse Hotlines 
 
Another extra-legal approach to protecting online reputation is the 
increased use of Internet hotlines that can be established on a voluntary 
basis by various online service providers.248  Users of online services can be 
empowered to report online abuses by telephone, fax, email, or submission 
of an online form.  Hotlines should ideally be as confidential as possible, 
and those who claim abuse should be given some information about how 
complaints will be handled and the circumstances under which complaints 
may be referred to a public authority.249  Of course, this assumes the 
existence of an appropriate authority to deal with relevant complaints. 
 
The British Internet Watch Foundation exemplifies the hotline 
approach in reporting illegal online conduct involving certain types of 
Internet content including: (a) sexual images of children; (b) obscene adult 
content; (c) material inciting racial hatred; and, (d) inappropriate behavior 
towards a child online.250  Users can report such content in a variety of 
                                                 
247
  Discussion with clinical Professor Laura McNally, March 15, 2010. 
248
  Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 29 (critiquing several existing Internet hotlines). 
249
  id. 
250
  See www.iwf.org.uk/reporting.htm, last viewed on May 19, 2010. 
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ways including submission of an online form.251  In the United States, the 
CyberTipline is another example of a hotline for reporting certain damaging 
conduct much of which involves children: for example, child prostitution, 
child molestation, and sex tourism involving children.252   
 
Some of the more salient advantages of hotlines in the context of 
online abuses include the fact that they can open up channels of 
communication between victims, observers of harmful conduct, and law 
enforcement authorities.253  Hotlines also enable ready collection of data 
about online abuses including data about the nature of prevalent abuses and 
demographic characteristics of typical abusers and victims.254  Hotlines can 
thus enable law enforcement agencies to gain a clearer picture of online 
abusive conduct and to target enforcement activities appropriately.  Reports 
generated by hotlines, when released to the public, can also serve an 
important public education function, increasing awareness of damaging 
online conduct and enabling individuals, pro bono and private services to 
develop targeted tools to respond to specific abuses. 
 
3.  Evolving Online Norms 
 
Social norms interact with other regulatory modalities in cyberspace 
as in the physical world.  Norms both influence and respond to legal and 
market developments.  For example, a law may alter normative behavior by 
requiring compliance or simply by expressing appropriate behavioral 
standards.255  Markets will often respond to online norms: for example, 
reputation management businesses developed as society became less civil 
online and a market demand grew for tools to protect individual reputations.  
The question today is how to develop norms that foster more civil and 
accountable online communities. 
 
One approach is to develop online forums that promote community 
standards of responsibility and accountability.  For example, to counter the 
Juicy Campus debacle,256 a Princeton student created the 
“ownwhatyouthink.com” website, asking students to pledge not to visit 
anonymous gossip sites and to be accountable for their own online 
                                                 
251
  id. 
252
  See www.missingkids.com, last viewed on May 19, 2010. 
253
  Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 32. 
254
  id. 
255
  See supra note 153 (on law’s expressive functions). 
256
  Cohen-Almagor, supra note 3, at 13-14 (describing harmful online postings about 
college students on the juicycampus.com website). 
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communications.257  The site sports the banner headline:  “Anonymity = 
Cowardice”.258 
 
Of course, norms may work in opposing directions and society – or 
large sectors of society – may simply become desensitized to many online 
abuses.  As one commentator has noted:  “Maybe we soon will simply 
yawn in boredom the next time we see a tweet typed in an inebriated rant, 
or a Facebook photo of a friend – or perhaps even ourselves – dancing on a 
table with bloodshot eyes.”259  Even if we become desensitized to these 
kinds of communications, one would hope that we never become 
desensitized to dangerous and harmful conduct like cyberbullying and 
harassment involving threats of physical harm, or online communications 
that seriously damage an individual’s livelihood or reputation. 
 
4.  Industry Self-Regulation 
 
Market self-regulation initiatives may also be an important part of 
the regulatory matrix.  Self-regulation may be adopted voluntarily or may 
be a result of pressure from customers or from governments.  In the cyber-
abuse context, the relevant industry is difficult to define. Online abuses 
occur in a variety of online forums including social networking sites, blogs 
and even online multi-player games.  Search engines like Google will be 
implicated here because they play such a significant role in determining 
which Internet users see what information.  Self-regulation initiatives in at 
least some industries might serve an important educational and normative 
function for those involved in online communications more generally. 
 
Facebook’s attempts to use members’ information for advertising 
has been one area where user norms and preferences have often conflicted 
with Facebook’s business plans, and Facebook has attempted to respond 
accordingly.260  An example of the interplay between government and 
market regulation in the social networking context is the 2008 Joint 
Statement on Key Principles of Social Networking Sites Safety adopted 
between MySpace and the state Attorneys-General.261  These principles are 
aimed at protecting children from inappropriate and harmful online conduct.  
                                                 
257
  See www.ownwhatyouthink.com, last viewed on May 19, 2010. 
258
  id. 
259
  McGarvey, supra note 196, at 29. 
260
  Lipton, supra note 4, at 973 (describing user backlash against Facebook’s Beacon 
advertising program); Zuckerberg, supra note 195 (describing Facebook’s new privacy 
policies and technological defaults). 
261
  Full text available at:  http://ago.mo.gov/newsreleases/2008/pdf/MySpace-
JointStatement0108.pdf, last viewed on May 21, 2010. 
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They encompass strategies such as developing software tools to protect 
children from harmful content,262 designing social networking sites in a way 
that prevents minors from accessing inappropriate conduct,263 educating 
parents and children about online safety issues,264 and ensuring that social 
networking sites cooperate with law enforcement agencies in protecting 
children online.265 
 
Another aspect of self-regulation that could be facilitated by 
cooperation between online user groups or by government regulation is the 
prospect of labeling, naming and shaming websites that provide a platform 
for cyber-wrongs.  For example, several years ago in the United Kingdom, 
the culture minister and her shadow minister presented the idea that online 
service providers might be named and shamed into dealing more 
proactively with violent and sexually explicit conduct on their sites.266  This 
is a difficult result to achieve in practice because it involves cooperation 
between a central agency and some realistic pressure brought to bear on 
websites to take action against harmful online conduct.  Additionally, 
because of the global nature of the Internet, definitions of “harmful 
conduct” may vary from community to community and country to country.  
Some countries, with stronger free speech protections, may protect speech 
that others sanction.  Of course, certain speech – like realistic threats of 
harm – should not be protected anywhere.  However, beyond that, it is 
difficult to draw clear lines about what kinds of conduct should lead to 
naming and shaming. 
 
Some other recent examples of self-regulation involve Google’s 
relatively new Google Search Wiki and Google Profile service.267  Google’s 
experimental Search Wiki enables Internet users to make comments on 
search results.268  Thus, a victim of reputational harm could use the service 
to contextualize or refute a criticism made about her.  However, the Search 
Wiki comments are not displayed unless an Internet searcher goes out of his 
                                                 
262
  id, Principle I. 
263
  id, Principle II. 
264
  id, Principle III. 
265
  id, Principle IV. 
266
  Patrick Wintour, Web Providers to be Named and Shamed Over Offensive 
Conduct, The Guardian, November 15, 2008 (full text available at:  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/nov/15/internet-children, last viewed on May 
21, 2010). 
267
  See generally FERTIK and THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 91 (describing these 
services). 
268
  id. 
[Draft:  July 31, 2010] Combating Cyber-Victimization 55 
way to enable them.269  Additionally, anyone can comment on any search 
result, so there is no way for an Internet user to screen for true or false 
comments.270  Google now also offers a Google Profile service that enables 
individuals to write a brief profile about themselves.271  These profiles may 
be displayed at the bottom of Google search results for personal names.272  
However, this service is currently limited in its impact because of the 
placement of the profiles at the bottom of a page of search results where 
they may be missed by a searcher.273  Additionally, they have limited use 
for people with common names.274 
 
Another form of self-regulation which is potentially relevant to the 
protection of online reputation is the Wikipedia online dispute resolution 
service.  It is more and more common for individuals to be profiled on 
Wikipedia which is a participatory and interactive repository for knowledge 
on many different subjects.275  The participatory nature of Wikipedia means 
that an individual will not necessarily control information about her that 
may be posted on a Wikipedia page.276  Wikipedia has its own online 
dispute resolution procedure to verify the accuracy of information posted, 
and this may be utilized by individuals harmed by false or decontextualized 
postings.277  While this approach is specific to Wikipedia, there is no reason 
why other online service providers could not adopt similar approaches if 
they wanted to assist their users in combating reputational harms. 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
 
“The Internet is a powerful and wonderful tool that has ushered in a new 
information age.  If purposely misused, however, the internet can be terrifying, and 
even deadly.”278 
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The Internet is an unparalleled global communications medium.  
However, online interactions can be harmful, leading to emotional suffering 
and physical harm.  The current legal system has gone some way towards 
protecting victims of online harms.  However, the law still has a long way 
to go.  Legal remedies will always suffer limitations related to time, cost, 
and jurisdictional challenges in a borderless online world. Further, the 
embarrassment and humiliation often associated with a victim bringing a 
complaint will chill much legal action.   
 
Like many other aspects of Internet regulation, effective responses 
to online abuse will require a multi-modal regulatory framework.  
Regulatory modalities such as social norms, public education and market 
forces will need to interact to create more comprehensive responses to 
online abuses.  Reputation management services play an important role in 
this regulatory matrix, but are subject to their own limitations.  Current 
approaches to online abuse might be improved if the existing commercial 
services could be supplemented with more easily affordable pro bono 
services, and if individuals could be empowered themselves to engage 
proactively in reputation management strategies.  Increased funding for, 
and use of, hotlines would also be a step forward both in combating specific 
abuses and in providing more reliable and comprehensive data about online 
abuses.  Attempts at industry self regulation, potentially in concert with 
government incentives, would also be a useful development.     
 
A number of the proposals made in this article would require 
funding which is always a tall order, particularly in troubled economic 
times.  On a more positive note, most of the suggestions made here are not 
particularly difficult to implement.  They predominantly take advantage of 
tools already available and apply them in new ways.  The extra-legal 
remedies advocated here also have the advantage that they do not rely on 
government action other than potentially some funding, so they do not run 
into significant First Amendment concerns.279  Additionally, enhancing 
private mechanisms avoids some of the problems typically inherent in 
litigating to identify and to assert jurisdiction over often anonymous or 
pseudonymous defendants.  Tackling online abuses is a global problem.  
Private bodies acting in concert with each other and with domestic 
governments have a better chance of reaching optimum solutions than 
governments acting alone. 
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